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ABSTRACT 
Private label growth in emerging markets has not kept pace with the growth in 
private labels elsewhere. For instance, in Europe and North America, private labels now 
constitute an average of 35% of total retail market share, compared to emerging markets, 
where market shares vary between 1% and 8 %. This dissertation examines the possibility 
that differences in private-label performance between developed and emerging 
economies is not driven by one mechanism, but arises from a variety of sources, both 
structural, and behavioral. Specifically, I focus on manufacturers’ bargaining power, 
retailers’ private label portfolio strategies, and consumers’ perceptions of private labels. 
In most emerging economies, national brand manufacturers tend to be the sole producers 
of private labels. As a result, manufacturers have inherent bargaining power and can deter 
retailers from pursuing aggressive private label strategies, which results in low private 
label market shares. Moreover, some retailers in emerging economies now carry their 
private labels as part of a multi-tiered portfolio. However, a small price-gap between the 
quality tiers results in high intraportfolio competition leading to cannibalization and 
lower private label market shares. Last, private label market shares in emerging 
economies may be smaller than in developed economies because low-income households 
prefer higher priced national brands. This counterintuitive phenomenon is driven by two 
interrelated factors. First, social influence implies that low-income households are 
upward-comparing, they contrast themselves with high-income households whom they 
believe are better-off. Because higher-income households purchase national brands, 
upward-comparisons lead to a preference for national brands. Second, low income 
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households are unknowledgeable about private label advancements hence they prefer 
national brands. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Private labels continue to make significant inroads into the packaged goods 
market. Over the past decade alone, annual sales of private-label products have risen by 
over 55% in supermarkets and by 96% in drugstore chains, reaching more than $115.3 
billion in 2015 (Private Label Manufacturers Association 2015). Private label growth is 
particularly apparent in the premium segment, where revenues continue to grow rapidly. 
According to a 2015 Nielsen report, overall revenues from private labels increased 2.5% 
in 2015, pushing private label dollar share up one and half points to 21.5%, a record high. 
However, the rate of private label growth varies widely across geographical markets. In 
Europe and North America, private labels now constitute an average of 35% of total retail 
market share, whereas market shares vary between 1% and 8 % in developing countries 
(see figure 1).  In this dissertation, my goal is to investigate the primary causes of failure 
among private labels, and to explain the relatively low private label penetration rates 
observed in emerging markets. Specifically, I investigate whether differences in vertical 
relationships between manufacturers and retailers, retailers’ private label portfolio 
strategies, and consumers’ perceptions of private labels, limit private label growth in 
developing relative to developed economies. 
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Figure 1.  Private label Market Shares by Country  
 
Existing research identifies several factors that cause private-label penetration 
rates to vary across product categories and retailers. However, there have been limited 
efforts to understand variation in private-label penetration rates across geographical 
markets. Steenkamp, Van Heerde, and Geyskens (2010) use survey data from 23 
countries in Asia, Europe, and the Americas to show that product innovation, distinctive 
packaging and private label production by national brand manufacturers impacts the price 
premium consumers are willing to pay for private labels. They however, make no 
attempts to determine why private labels market shares vary across countries. Erdem and 
Chang (2012) find evidence of learning spillover effects of umbrella brands across 
multiple categories for private labels in three different countries (i.e. the United States, 
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the United Kingdom, and Spain). However, they also make no attempts to determine why 
private label-penetration varies across countries and why market shares are sharply lower 
in emerging markets.  
In contrast with the two preceding studies, Cuneo et al (2015) attempt to explain 
variation in private label market shares across different countries. They examine how 
retail distribution channels, the presence of multinational retailers, and logistics networks 
determine the success of private labels in different countries. They find that private label 
market shares are high in countries where grocery items are sold through well-developed 
modern channels such as supermarkets, hypermarkets and discounters, as opposed to 
less-developed traditional channels like small local chains and independent outlets. 
However, modern grocery retailing has gained traction in most emerging markets as both 
local and global retailers seeking high-growth opportunities have expanded rapidly. Yet 
private label market shares are still very low, even in markets with seemingly modern 
grocery channels (A.T. Kearney 2013).  
Moreover, these authors argue that the presence of multinational retailers in a 
market often results in high private label market shares. Because brands from 
multinationals have stronger appeal, especially in emerging economies where consumers 
aspire to consume brands that are popular elsewhere, private labels from multinational 
retailers should be successful. However, this viewpoint is somewhat incomplete and 
contradictory because country-of-origin studies show that customers are “ethnocentric”, 
in that they prefer local brands, particularly in food-product categories (Netemeyer et al 
1991; Mooij 2013; Siamagka and Balabanis 2015).  
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Last, they conclude that private label market shares vary across countries because 
of the logistical challenges that retailers face in the distribution of private label products. 
They argue that, in these countries, supply chain networks are underdeveloped, 
inefficient, uncompetitive and unreliable. However, they fail to explain how national 
brand manufacturers thrive under the same conditions. Moreover, they also contend that 
retailers in these markets lack both technical and financial capabilities required to run 
successful private label programs. Yet, there is a strong presence of both large local and 
large multinational retailers in most of these countries. For example, US retailing giant 
Walmart has a footprint in most emerging markets, as it operates in India, China, South 
Africa, Brazil and Argentina. Likewise, other global players such as Carrefour, a leading 
French retailer, the UK’s Tesco and Germany’s Aldi have subsidiaries in most emerging 
markets (A.T. Kearney 2013). These apparent shortcomings all but negate generalizations 
following from differences in logistical networks. My research examines instead 
differences in vertical relationships between private-label manufacturers and retailers, 
retailers’ private-label portfolio strategies, and consumers’ perceptions of private labels, 
on private label growth in developing markets 
My dissertation is comprised of three essays. In the first, I consider the nature of 
vertical relationships in the grocery supply channel. In the second, I consider retailers’ 
private label portfolio strategies and in the third, I consider consumer perceptions and 
attitudes toward private labels. Taken together, these three essays provide a 
comprehensive explanation for the multiple factors that explain why private label shares 
are lower in developing relative to developed economies.  
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In the first essay, the contribution to low private label market shares results from a 
fundamental difference in the relationships between grocery buyers and suppliers in 
developing economies relative to those in developed economies. Namely, in saturated 
and consolidated western markets, where private label market shares are highest, retailers 
either produce their own private labels or acquire them from contract manufacturers 
(Meza and Sudhir 2009). In most emerging markets, in contrast, retailers source their 
private labels solely from national brands manufacturers (Song 2008; Beneke 2009; Van 
Wyk 2013).  This supply arrangement  allows national brand manufacturers to directly 
influence both national and private label retail prices by jointly selecting wholesale prices 
for each brand (Innes and Hamilton 2009; Kumar, Radhakrishnan and Rao 2010).  
In, Chapter 2, I utilize bread sales data from a major South African market to 
investigate whether national brand manufacturers possess sufficient bargaining power to 
remove retailers’ incentives to produce their own private labels, and how that may affect 
private label market share, and consumer welfare. Specifically, I use a structural 
econometric approach to analyze the vertical relationships between manufacturers and 
retailers and to estimate the degree of bargaining power exercised by manufacturers in 
setting relatively high wholesale prices on private labels.  
I find that manufacturers, set wholesale prices for private label products that provide 
margins equal to their own national brands, this results in high wholesale prices on 
private labels. In turn, high wholesale prices , result not only in higher private label retail 
prices, but suppresses private label market shares as retailers have little incentive to 
develop and promote aggressive private label programs.  
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Supplier-retailer relationships are only part of a retail-value chain structure that 
affects retail private label margins and market shares (Meza and Sudhir 2009). In my 
second essay, I investigate how private label portfolio strategies, or designing tiers of 
private labels that target premium quality, standard quality and economical shoppers at 
three different price-quality points, may also  determine private label shares (Geyskens, 
Gielens, and Gijsbrechts 2009). Portfolio strategies allow retailers to satisfy multiple 
customers segments as they can target customers based on their price and quality 
preferences (Ailawadi and Keller 2004; Kumar and Steenkamp 2007). But, for a portfolio 
strategy to increase private label market share, the tiers within the portfolio must be 
distinct, and complementarity to overall store-brand growth.  
Most retailers in emerging economies now carry a portfolio of private labels that 
spans different customer segments (Planet Retail 2012; Beneke 2009). However, the 
price-gap between low, medium and premium-quality private labels in their portfolios is 
very small, moreover, in some cases low and medium-quality private labels are priced 
more than high-quality brand alternatives (Euromonitor 2014). In Chapter 3, I examine 
whether the price-gap between private labels in different tiers impacts perceived brand 
similarity, cannibalization, and private label market shares.  
From an economic perspective, narrow price-gaps imply that brands are regarded 
as similar, so will cannibalize sales from each other. In order to investigate this 
possibility econometrically, I utilize data from the South African breakfast cereal market 
in a discrete-choice framework that allows brand similarity to shift demand.  The brand 
similarity measure in this model represents a second-order effect that not only accounts 
for brand attributes but also the price differential between the tiers. I test whether a 
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narrow price-gap between brands in different tiers impacts brand similarity and how this 
impacts private label market shares.  I then conduct counterfactual simulations to 
determine the effect of varying brand similarity on private label market shares.  
My results show that the price-gap contributes to perceived brand similarity such 
that when the gap is small customers cannot distinguish between brands in different 
price-quality tiers. This results in increased intraportfolio competition, cannibalization, 
and lower private label market shares. Moreover, a narrow price-gap results in a 
minimally differentiated private label portfolio counter to the Principle of Maximum 
Differentiation (d’Aspremont et al 1979) which states that an equilibrium in 
differentiated product markets occurs when the products are highly differentiated i.e. 
when the products are located further away from each other (Irmen and Thisse 1998; 
Rajan and Sinha 2009).  This suggests that retailers’ private label portfolio management 
strategies may also in part explain the relatively low private label market shares in 
emerging markets.  
Ultimately, consumers are the final link in the private label supply chain. Given 
that most manufacturers rely on their retail partners to create direct relationships with 
their consumers, the supplier-retailer relationship is an important antecedent for brand 
success (Poirier and Reiter 1996). Consumers’ not only influence supplier-retailer 
conduct in the market place but also what product or brands are manufactured and how 
they are marketed. In both developed and emerging markets, low-income households 
show preferences for national brands (Sinha and Batra 1995; Bronnenburg et al 2015). 
Taking into account that a majority of consumers in emerging markets are low income, 
most retailers in these markets are reluctant to market private labels. Against this 
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background, I examine why low-income households consume more expensive brands and 
how this impacts private label penetration, particularly in emerging markets.   
In Chapter 4, I seek to determine which persuasion appeals (descriptive appeals 
and informational appeals) are most effective at motivating low-income consumers to 
buy private labels. In so doing, I provide insight into the underlying cause of why low-
income consumers prefer national brands to private labels, and its implications for private 
label market share. Informational appeals are designed to target the rationality of 
consumers by providing objective information on brand quality, price promotions and 
product attributes (Cutler et al 2000). For example, to motivate consumers into buying 
certain products or brands, retailers can provide consumers with factual information 
about tangible product features such as product quality or attributes. Consequently, if 
informational appeals increase private label consumption among low income consumers 
it suggests that lack of private label information is a cause of why low income consumers 
do not buy private labels.   
On the other hand, descriptive appeals are emotive and are often based on social 
influence (Cialdini et al 2006). For example, to encourage consumers to buy certain 
products or brands retailers can link the products to an aspirational reference groups (i.e. 
positive groups that individual aspire to be part of).  The influence of reference groups on 
consumers’ purchase decisions is well documented in the marketing literature. 
Aspirational reference groups have been shown to exert influence over an individual’s 
consumption decisions (Taylor and Lobel 1989; Aspinwall and Taylor 1993; Zeelenberg 
and Pieters 2011). Therefore, if descriptive appeals increase private label consumption 
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among low income consumers it implies social influence is also a major reason why low 
income consumers do not buy private labels.   
 I find that informational appeals are the most effective way of increasing private 
label consumption. I also find that descriptive appeals that are based on the preferences of 
aspirational reference groups also encourage low-income consumers to buy private 
labels. These results suggest that low-income consumers prefer national brands to private 
labels for two main reasons. First, they do not consume private labels because they are 
generally unaware of private label attributes and quality.  This may be due to the fact that 
private labels are rarely advertised, and because of financial constraints low-income 
consumers may be wary about purchasing new and unfamiliar brands because of the 
relative risk associated with it (Sinha and Batra 1999). Second, low-income may prefer 
national brands to private labels because of social influences. I find that under a complex 
set of structural and social interactions low-income individuals are status seeking and this 
influences their brand choices in a grocery-retail setting. More specifically, I find that 
low-income consumers associate private labels with other low-income households and 
national brands with high income households. Ultimately these associations result in 
them preferring national brands over private labels. These findings may explain the 
relatively low private label market shares in emerging markets. 
Chapter 5 offers a summary of my findings and a discussion on the implications 
for retailing in developing economies, and the economics of development more generally. 
I also offer some comments on how my findings may generalize beyond the markets and 
the product category considered here. My findings provide more general insights into 
manufacturer-retailer relationships. I find that when national brand manufacturers are the 
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sole producers of private labels they generally price in excess of purely competitive 
levels implying that they have the ability to influence retailers’ decisions. I show that 
manufacturers exercise bargaining  power by setting high wholesale prices on private 
labels, which results in high private label retail prices, and, ultimately, low private label 
market shares. 
The implications for practitioners are also important. Taking into account that, I 
find that when manufacturer bargaining power is low, private labels market shares and 
retailer margins are high, if retailers can attenuate manufacturer bargaining power by 
either producing their own private labels or by partnering with contract manufacturers it 
may increase private label market shares and subsequently their overall profits. On the 
other hand manufactures earn higher margins by producing both their own brands and 
private labels, so are not likely to change the status quo. 
The results also highlight that when manufacturer bargaining power is low, 
overall retail prices are low as well. This finding has clear implications for consumers, in 
that expansion of private labels can aid households in developing economies to fight food 
insecurity. Evidence points to the fact that food prices are higher in the least developed 
countries of the world as compared to the wealthier nations, thus, they can benefit from 
less expensive food.    
In my second essay, I find evidence that the price-gap between brands in a 
portfolio impacts brands preferences within that portfolio. More specifically, I find that a 
narrow price-gap results in cannibalization of upper-tier brands. These results from this 
study also generalize beyond the market and products considered here. In that they 
highlight that a narrow price-gap between brands in a portfolio, private label or otherwise 
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results in high cross-brand sales in which the high quality brands loses out. This not only 
results in reduced market shares but also potential loss of revenues.  
In my third essay I highlight the role of consumer knowledge and social influence 
in brand choice. Specifically, I find that low-income consumers prefer national brands 
over private labels for two main reasons. First, low-income consumers are uninformed 
about private labels, they are generally unaware that private quality advances hence they 
avoid buying them. Second, low-income consumers buy national brands so as to enhance 
their social standing. They, fervently believe that high-income consumers buy national 
brands and thus they desire national brands as well. In fact, informing them that private 
labels are consumers by high income consumers increases their purchase intentions and 
willingness to pay for private labels. These results validate the role of social influence in 
non-durable products such as grocery items that are mostly consumed in private. An area 
current research is yet to investigate.   
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CHAPTER 2 
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF MANUFACTURER POWER ON PRIVATE LABEL 
MARKET SHARE IN AN EQUILIBRIUM FRAMEWORK.  
Abstract 
Private label growth in emerging markets has not kept pace with the growth in private 
labels elsewhere. In Europe and North America, private labels now constitute an average 
of 35% of total retail market share, but market shares vary between 1% and 8 % in 
developing countries. Existing explanations for this observation do not account for the 
unique nature of manufacturer-retail relationships in emerging economies. That is, in 
most emerging economies, national brand manufacturers tend to be the sole producers of 
private labels. I investigate whether national brand manufacturers possess bargaining 
power relative to retail buyers and, if so, I examine how this may affect private label 
market shares. The results show that dominant manufacturers set relatively high 
wholesale prices for private labels, which reduces retailers’ margins on private labels, and 
results in higher-priced private label products. Lower private label market shares result.   
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Introduction 
The rise in private label market shares in emerging markets has not kept pace with 
growth elsewhere. While private label shares in  the UK, Canada, the US and Switzerland  
are 43%, 28%, 25% and 54% respectively,  penetration rates in emerging markets 
average 3%1. In this chapter, I seek to explain the gap in private label market shares 
between developed and developing economies by examining the unique structure of 
manufacturer-retailer relationships in developing economies. In most emerging markets 
national brand manufacturers tend to be the sole producers of private labels. Therefore, I 
investigate whether they possess bargaining power relative to retailers and, if so, how this 
impacts private label market shares. 
There has been a limited amount of effort to understand variation in private label 
penetration rates across geographical markets. Erdem et al (2012) show that variation in 
private label market shares among the United States, Spain, and the United Kingdom is 
partly due to variation in consumers’ private label quality expectations, quality 
uncertainty, and risk perceptions. However, their comparison does not include any 
emerging economies. In contrast, Cuneo et al (2015) attempt to explain private label 
market share variability across a sample of markets that includes some  developing 
economies, arguing that private label market shares vary because of logistical challenges 
faced by retailers. Specifically, they contend that in markets where private labels 
underperform, supply chain networks are underdeveloped, inefficient, uncompetitive, and 
                                                          
1 For example private label market shares are 5.3% in Argentina, 1.5% in India, 3.5% in Brazil and 9.5% in 
South Africa. 
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unreliable. However, they fail to explain how national brand manufacturers in these 
economies thrive under the same conditions. Moreover, they also argue that retailers in 
these markets lack both the technical and financial capability required to run successful 
private label programs. Yet, in a number of these markets there is a strong presence not 
only of large local retailers, but also divisions of large, well-capitalized, multinational 
retailers.   
What is different in the structure of retailing between developing and developed 
countries that may help explain why private label market shares are low in emerging 
economies?  Retailers in both regions are highly sophisticated, often multi-national, and 
sell groceries through hundreds of individual locations. Consumers in emerging markets 
have less disposable income, but that would argue for higher private label shares, not 
lower. Perhaps the most striking difference lies in the upstream relationships between 
retailers and suppliers.  In developed economies, contract manufacturers tend to produce 
private labels, whereas national brand manufacturers are largely responsible in most 
emerging economies (Song 2011; Beneke 2009; Van Wyk 2013). This supply 
arrangement suggests two possible explanations for low private label market shares in 
emerging economies.  
First, market shares may be low because national brand manufacturers set 
relatively high wholesale prices on private labels. Unlike in developed economies were 
retailers earn relatively high margins on private labels because of their favorable 
bargaining position relative to contract manufacturers (Meza, and Sudhir 2010). Retailers 
in developing countries are not able to match the scale and quality of the national brand 
manufacturers through equivalent contractor relationships. Manufacturers, therefore, set 
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wholesale prices for private label products that provide margins equal to their own 
national brands, leaving retailers with little incentive to price private labels aggressively 
in competition with national brands. This behavior by manufacturers is consistent with 
prior studies showing that wholesale prices are directly related to the number of upstream 
firms and bargaining power, (Gilbert and Hastings 2001). A smaller number of upstream 
suppliers suggests that the supply chain is consolidated, this in turn creates incentives for 
upstream firms to increase wholesale prices as they have bargaining power over 
downstream firms (Riordan 2008). 
Second, it may instead be that national brand manufacturers’ position manifests 
not in high private-label wholesale prices, but in low wholesale prices. Extant research 
finds that firms with bargaining power often engage in pricing strategies aimed at 
eliminating or substantially reducing competition. For example, they may maximize long 
term profits by setting their prices relatively low in order to drive out competitors and to 
create barriers to entry for potential new rivals (Galbraith and Stiles 1983; Bhuyan and 
Lopes 2007). Therefore, national brand manufacturers may seek to foreclose any 
possibility of losing their advantage in the private label market by offering retailers low 
wholesale prices. This translates to high margins on private labels for the retailers. 
Although manufacturers earn less on private labels, their margins on national brands are 
still relatively high such that the two margins are in equilibrium. However, by offering 
private labels at low wholesale prices it effectively eliminate any incentives for retailers 
to seek alternative sources of supply, as such private label market shares remain low. 
Thus, in a competitive equilibrium, retailers have no incentive to compete. Therefore, 
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which of these two explanations to why private label market shares are low in emerging 
economies is more likely is an empirical question.  
I investigate this question using retail bread sales data from a major South African 
retail market. I analyze this data using a structural econometric framework in which I test 
whether national brand manufacturers possess bargaining power and, if they do, whether 
wholesale prices are nearer the competitive or non-competitive benchmarks. I use 
counterfactual simulations to determine how wholesale bargaining power may affect 
private label wholesale prices, wholesale margins, retail margins, and, consequently, 
private label market shares.  
I find that manufacturers generally price in excess of purely competitive levels, 
which implies that they exercise a measure of upstream bargaining power. Importantly, I 
find that in equilibrium national brand manufacturers set relatively high wholesale prices 
on private labels, resulting in high private label retail prices, and low private label market 
shares. Moreover, retail prices of both national brands and private labels are highest when 
manufacturers’ bargaining power is relatively high.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In the next section I 
describe the South African private label manufacturing market and its similarities to other 
retail markets in emerging economies. In the third section I explain in detail the effects of 
manufacturers’ bargaining power on both the manufacturer-retailer relationship, and 
consumer welfare. The fourth section presents the structural econometric model of retail 
bread demand, and manufacturer supply. I explain how the model was estimated in the 
fifth section. I then describe the South African private label retail and bread markets, and 
provide some descriptive statistics that highlight key price and market share trends. The 
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estimation results are interpreted in the sixth section.  Last, I discuss the results, 
formulate conclusions and offer managerial and policy implications. 
Private Labels in Emerging Markets 
Unlike in western markets, where retailers can acquire private labels from multiple 
suppliers at wholesale prices that are close to marginal cost (Kumar and Steenkamp 2007; 
Sayman and Raju 2007), retailers in most emerging economies procure private labels 
solely from national brand manufacturers. In this supply arrangement, both retailers and 
manufacturers derive mutual benefits. Retailers procure private labels from national 
brand manufacturers for quality and cost assurances and better category management 
(Hoch 1996). On the other hand, even though manufacturers make substantial margins 
from the sale of their own brands, private-label production permits them to use excess 
production capacity, leading to higher overall margins (Quelch and Harding 1996; 
Narasimhan and Wilcox 1998). Importantly, private label production also allows 
manufacturers to directly regulate retailers and contract manufacturers in the private label 
supply chain (Innes and Hamilton 2009). As such, private label manufacturing in 
emerging economies is dominated by a few manufacturers.  
In nearly all developing economies, private label manufacturing is controlled by a 
few very large firms that also dominate sales in most food categories (Sexton 2010; das 
Nair and Chisoro 2015). For example, in South Africa a majority of the private labels are 
manufactured by large national brand manufacturing companies, Tiger Brands, Pioneer 
Foods, Unilever-Unifoods, Heinz and Premier Foods (Van Wyk 2013; Lodestar 
Marketing Research; Euromonitor 2014). With few suppliers, manufacturers may be in 
an advantageous bargaining position relative to retailers, and with respect to their own 
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upstream suppliers. For example, manufacturers can pressure suppliers into providing 
large quantities of raw materials at relatively low prices (Reardon and Barrett 2000), and 
can control distribution by “pushing” goods through to retailers (Sexton 2010).  
Importantly, manufacturers may have the ability to determine prices, create barriers to 
entry (Bhuyan and Lopes 1997; Azzam 1997) and can possess bargaining power (Bayus 
and Putsis 1999; Lenox, Rockart and Lewin 2007). 
Private label manufacturing in most emerging economies is also characterized by 
vertically integrated national brand manufacturers. For example, nearly all national brand 
manufacturers in the South African market that produce private labels are vertically 
integrated with input suppliers. The leading manufacturers --Tiger Brands, Pioneer 
Foods, Foodcorp and Premier Foods -- each own subsidiaries that dominate the wheat 
and corn milling industries (Mncube 2010; National Chamber of Milling 2011). Vertical 
integration reduces manufacturers’ costs throughout the supply chain as it allows greater 
control over transportation costs, material costs, and factory overheads (Stuckey, and 
White 1993). This is particularly important given that food manufacturing is both capital 
intensive and higher-cost than in other markets, especially for contract manufacturers 
who generally have limited access to operating capital (Mncube 2013; Food and 
Agricultural Organization 2014). 
Vertical integration may also explain why private label manufacturing in 
emerging economies is dominated by a few manufacturers.  Essentially, vertically 
integrated manufacturers invest heavily in productive capacity and expertise in order to 
keep contract manufacturers out, and private-label competition minimal (Ellickson 2007). 
Firms compete by over-investing in capital in order to signal their ability to compete 
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aggressively on price, or endogenize fixed costs (Sutton 1991). When incumbent 
manufacturers incur additional fixed costs in order to either raise quality or to reduce 
variable costs, they are able to sustain oligopoly power. Moreover, incumbent 
manufacturers engage in a competitive escalation of investments as the size of the market 
increases. Using this logic, the private label manufacturing market consists of only a few, 
relatively powerful firms, protected by substantial barriers to entry, because 
manufacturers compete for consumers by offering competitive prices which requires 
continual fixed investments in vertical integration. 
In addition, incumbent manufacturers’ increase entry-capital requirements and the 
minimum efficient scale of operations for potential entrants (Krattenmaker and Salop 
1986; Ordover, Saloner and Salop 1990). Consequently, retailers and contract 
manufacturers may have to enter all stages of production in order to compete efficiently. 
These entry-barriers potentially give rise to bargaining power (Riordan 1998). Therefore, 
given that there are few firms in the private label supply chain in emerging economies, 
the existing firms are protected by entry barriers, that private label manufacturers are 
vertically integrated, they may indeed possess bargaining power. I test this possibility, 
and whether high or low wholesale prices on private labels are responsible for the low 
private label market shares in emerging economies using the framework described below. 
Model Specification 
In this section, I describe an empirical model of private label demand and supply that is 
able to test for any exercise of bargaining power on the part of private-label suppliers. 
The model is structural in the sense that I specify private label demand, supply, and 
equilibrium pricing models under the assumption that both retailers and manufacturers 
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operate in imperfectly competitive markets. On the demand side, I model consumers’ 
discrete purchasing choices, using a random parameter logit model. On the supply side I 
assume Bertrand-Nash competition between manufacturers and retailers (Villas-Boas and 
Zhao 2007). I then estimate the extent of deviation from Bertrand-Nash margins, and 
interpret deviations from the maintained equilibrium as evidence of bargaining power 
(Villas-Boas and Zhao 2005; Draganska and Klapper 2007; Richards and Allender 2010). 
I also consider counterfactuals that examine the effects of bargaining power on private 
label market shares. I begin my analysis by modeling consumer demand, and then 
conditional on the demand estimates, I calculate profit- maximizing retailer and 
manufacturer margins implied by the vertical model of the supply chain 
Consumer Demand 
I model consumer demand at the household level assuming preferences for differentiated 
products are randomly distributed among consuming households. Households make 
discrete choices among brands each week, choosing one brand from among several other 
brands. Utility depends on random elements, product attributes, and observed 
heterogeneity.  
Formally, I assume that consumers choose one unit of the brand that offers the 
highest utility, and they choose only one brand during each shopping trip. Thus, the 
indirect utility customer 𝑖 obtains from purchasing product 𝑗, at time period 𝑡, depends on 
product and consumer characteristics. With these assumptions, indirect utility is written 
as: 
 𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑋𝑗𝑡𝛽𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡,                                                                   (1) 
  
21 
 
where 𝑋𝑗  is a vector of characteristics for product 𝑗, 𝑝𝑗𝑡 represents the price of product 𝑗 
during time period 𝑡, , 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is an error term that is assumed to be independently and 
identically distributed across both products and consumers and 𝛼𝑖 is consumer 𝑖 ‘s 
marginal utility of income. Here, I allow 𝛼𝑖 to vary randomly across consumers such that:   
𝛼𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝜎𝑣𝑖 ,       𝑣𝑖~𝑁(0,1),                                                    (2) 
where 𝛼the mean price response is across all consumers, 𝑣𝑖  summarizes all the 
unobserved individual-specific characteristics and, 𝜎 is a coefficient that characterizes 
how consumer marginal disutilities of price vary with respect to average disutility 𝛼 
according to unobserved characteristics. Following Nevo (2001) equation (1) can be 
further decomposed into two components: 
𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿𝑗𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡,                                                             (3) 
where:  
𝛿𝑗𝑡 = 𝑋𝑗𝑡𝛽 − 𝛼𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝜉𝑗𝑡  ,                                                           (4) 
In equation (3) the first term, 𝛿𝑗𝑡, is the mean utility level of brand 𝑗, it is a product-
specific term that is common to all consumers. The second term, 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 denotes the 
deviation from the mean-level utility, which captures the effects of all random elements. 
Therefore, indirect utility is redefined in terms of the mean utility and deviations from the 
mean utility as shown in equation (3).  I use the estimates from this model as inputs to the 
supply-side model which I describe next.  
Manufacturer and Retailer Conduct 
In order to estimate the degree of manufacturers’ bargaining power, I develop a model of 
the private label supply chain, and derive equilibrium wholesale and retail margins under 
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the maintained assumption of Bertrand-Nash manufacturer conduct. The nature of the 
vertical game is such that I assume the manufacturer Stackelberg pricing game. In this 
channel structure, the manufacturers are the first movers, they set the prices paid by the 
by retailers, who then, in turn, set prices to consumers for all brands in the category. This 
model has substantial empirical support in existing literature (e.g. Besanko, Dubé and 
Gupta 2003; Villas-Boas and Zhao 2005; Allender and Richards 2010). Taking into 
account that the manufacturers move first, I solve the model by backward induction, first 
describing the second-stage pricing decision made by retailers, and then the first-stage 
wholesale pricing decision. In the remainder of this section I derive the subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium in prices to this channel game.  
Retailer Pricing 
For a given array of products and wholesale prices, retailers set their prices to maximize 
the expected category profit. Thus, if there are 𝑁 Nash Bertrand multi-product oligopoly 
retailers and each retailer maximizes category profit from the sale of national and private 
labels. The profit for retailer 𝑟, for a particular time period, is given by:   
∏=   ∑ 𝑀 ∙ (𝑝𝑗 − 𝑤𝑗) ∙ 𝑆𝑗(𝑝)
𝑗∈𝑆𝑟
,
𝑟
                                                     (5) 
where 𝑗 represents the products carried by a retailer in a category, 𝑝𝑗 is the price the 
retailer sets for product 𝑗 , 𝑤𝑗 is the manufacturer price paid by the retailer for 
product 𝑗, 𝑆𝑗 is the market share of product 𝑗 which is a function of the prices of all 𝐽 
products, 𝑆𝑟 is the set of products sold by retailer 𝑟, and 𝑀 is the size of the local market. 
Assuming a pure strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in prices exists and that equilibrium 
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prices are strictly positive, the retail price 𝑝 of any product 𝑗 sold by retailer 𝑟 must 
satisfy the first-order profit-maximizing conditions: 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑝𝑗
= 𝑠𝑗 + ∑(𝑝𝑘 − 𝑤𝑘)
𝜕𝑠𝑘
𝜕𝑝𝑗
𝑘=𝑆𝑟
= 0,                                                     (6) 
Stacking the first order conditions for each product at each retailer and solving for retail 
prices, this linear system can be expressed in matrix notation as: 
𝒑 −𝒘 = −(𝑻𝑟 ∗ 𝚫𝑟)
−1 ∙ 𝑺(𝒑).                                                                 (7) 
where 𝑻𝒓 is a 𝐽 × 𝐽 ownership matrix with the general element 𝑻𝑟(𝑘, 𝑗) = 1 if a retailer 
has both products 𝑘 and 𝑗 in their portfolio and 𝑻𝑟(𝑘, 𝑗) = 0 otherwise,  ∆𝒓 is a 𝐽 × 𝐽  
response matrix which includes the first derivatives of market share of product 𝑗 with 
respect to all retail prices, with element 
𝜕𝑠𝑗
𝜕𝑝𝑘
, and 𝑻𝒓 ∗ ∆𝒓 is an element by-element 
multiplication of the two matrices.  Equation (7) represents the retailer’s decision rule 
that frames their pricing decisions, and conditions manufacturer’s upstream pricing 
decisions.  
Manufacturer Pricing  
On the manufacturer side, national brand manufacturers set prices to maximize total 
profits from all products sold. Generally, I assume that the manufacturers set their prices 
such that the surplus they acquire over production costs is maximized for all goods they 
produce, while accounting for retailers’ responses. Formally, the profit for manufacturer 
𝑚 is given by: 
∏ =∑𝑀 ∙ (𝑤𝑙 − 𝑐𝑙) ∙ 𝑆𝑙 (𝑝(𝑤)),                                                     (8)   
𝑙𝜖𝐺𝑓
𝑚
𝑙
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where 𝑐𝑙  is the marginal cost of producing product 𝑙 incurred by the manufacturer, 𝐺𝑓 is 
the set of products sold by manufacturer 𝑚, and the other terms are as explained earlier. 
The first order condition for the manufacturer is then given by: 
𝑆𝑙 + ∑ (𝑤𝑘 − 𝑐𝑘)
𝜕𝑆𝑘
𝜕𝑤𝑙
𝑙
𝑘=𝐺𝑓
= 0 ,                                                                   (9) 
Following Villas-Boas and Zhao (2005), I define the manufacturer ownership matrix 𝑻𝒎 
in a manner similar to that of the retail ownership matrix.  Specifically, element (𝑙,𝑚) of 
𝑻𝒎 is equal to 1 if the manufacturer produces both national brands and private labels i.e. 
𝑙 and 𝑚, and is otherwise equal to zero. The elements of the manufacturer's response 
matrix, 𝚫𝒎 are the derivatives of the product market shares with respect to all wholesale 
prices, i.e. 
𝜕𝑠𝑙
𝜕𝑤𝑖
. The matrix 𝚫𝒎 comprises of the cross price elasticity of demand and the 
effects of cost past through, these effects can be decomposed as follows by evoking the 
chain rule: 
𝚫𝒎 = ∆𝒑
′ 𝚫𝒓,                                                                                                   (10) 
where ∆𝑝 is the cost pass-through matrix, which is a matrix of derivatives of all the retail 
prices with respect to the wholesale prices and have the general element ∆𝑝(𝑘, 𝑙) =
𝜕𝑝𝑙
𝜕𝑤𝑘
 .The elements of the matrix ∆𝑝 are derived by totally differentiating, for a given 
product 𝑙, the retailer’s first-order condition in equation (6):  
∑[
𝜕𝑠𝑗
𝜕𝑝𝑘
+∑(𝑇𝑟(𝑖, 𝑗)
𝜕2𝑠𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑗𝜕𝑝𝑘
(𝑝𝑖 − 𝑤𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)) + 𝑇𝑟(𝑘, 𝑗)
𝜕𝑠𝑘
𝜕𝑝𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1
] 𝑑𝑝𝑘
⏟                                        
𝑔(𝑗,𝑘)
− 𝑇𝑟(𝑓, 𝑖)
𝜕𝑠𝑓
𝜕𝑝𝑗⏟      
ℎ(𝑗,𝑓)
𝑑𝑤𝑓 = 0 ,       (11)
𝑁
𝑘=1
 
Stacking these conditions for all 𝑙 = 1,2, … . . 𝑁 products together in a linear system, I 
obtain: 
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𝐺𝑑𝑝 − 𝐻𝑓𝑑𝑤𝑓 = 0,                                                                                         (12) 
The matrix 𝐺 has general element 𝑔(𝑙, 𝑘), and 𝐻𝑓 is an 𝑁 − dimensional vector with 
general element ℎ(𝑗, 𝑓). Rearranging terms leaves the vector,  
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝑤𝑓
= 𝐺−1𝐻𝑓 .   (18) 
Horizontally concatenating 𝐻𝑓 together for all products 𝑙, I obtain the matrix ∆𝒑=
𝑮−𝟏𝑯 ,  which has the derivatives of all prices with respect to all wholesale prices. 
Collecting terms and solving equation (14) for the manufacturers’ implied price-cost 
margins results in: 
𝒘− 𝒄 = −(𝑻𝒎 ∗ 𝚫𝒎)
−𝟏𝑺(𝒑).                                                                  (13) 
Finally, the implied price-cost margins for the whole channel are obtained by substituting 
equation (12) into (20) for retail and manufacturer prices respectively:   
𝒑 − 𝒄 = −(𝑻𝒎 ∗ 𝚫𝒎)
−𝟏𝑺(𝒑) + 𝚫𝒓
−𝟏 ∙ 𝑺(𝒑).                                        (14) 
where the first expression on the right side is manufacturer margin and the second 
expression is the retailer margin.  
All of the parameters needed to identify the equilibrium margin are in the price 
and demand side estimates, with the exception of marginal cost. Marginal cost is 
estimated as a linear function of input price variables such that:  
𝐶𝑙𝑡 = 𝜃𝜔𝑙𝑡 + 𝑢𝑗𝑡 ,         (15) 
where 𝜔jt is a vector of input prices (electricity, wheat-flour, diesel, labor), 𝜃 is the 
vector of input-price parameters, and 𝑢jt is the error term that accounts for unobserved 
shocks to marginal cost. 
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Manufacturer Power 
I assume that both manufacturers and retailers behave as Bertrand-Nash oligopolists, 
earning profits consistent with a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, which should be between 
perfect competition and monopoly. However, it is likely that real-world outcomes differ 
from any of these theoretical ideals. Therefore, following Villas-Boas and Zhao, (2005), 
Draganska and Klapper, (2007) and Allender and Richards (2010), I parameterize 
deviations from the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium to test for manufacturers’ bargaining 
power. I augment equation (14) by introducing multipliers that measure the deviation of 
the manufacturer margin 𝜃 and the retail margin 𝜙 from the maintained assumption at 
each level. Specifically I let, 𝑚𝑀 = −(𝑇𝑚 ∗ ∆𝑚)
−1𝑆(𝑝) represent the manufacturers’ 
margin and 𝑚𝑅 = ∆𝑠
−1 ∙ 𝑆(𝑝)  denote the retailers’ margin so equation (21) can be 
rewritten as: 
𝒑 = 𝒄 + 𝝓𝒎𝑹 + 𝜽𝒎𝑴.                                                                                (16) 
The estimating equations for the full model are, therefore, equation (1) for the demand 
side, and equation (14) for the supply side where 𝑐  is the marginal cost equation (15).  In 
terms of the supply model the estimating equation is written as: 
𝒑 = 𝒄 + 𝝓𝒎𝑹 + 𝜽𝒎𝑴 + 𝜺.                                                                          (17) 
where 𝜀 captures variations in price that are not explained by the model and are assumed 
to be i.i.d. If 𝜙 or 𝜃 are greater than 1 then both retailers and manufacturers price more 
cooperatively than in Bertrand-Nash  Equilibrium, but  if 𝜙 or 𝜃 are less than 1, then  
they are pricing more competitively. In effect,  𝜃  measures manufacturer power, as it 
parameterizes any observed deviation from Bertrand-Nash. Therefore, if it is greater than 
0, I can conclude that manufactures have bargaining power.  
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Counterfactual Simulations  
Estimating bargaining power, however, merely establishes the extent of imperfection in 
either the wholesale or retail market. How this is manifest in private-label shares requires 
simulating outcomes under alternative behavioral assumptions. Therefore, to determine 
the effects of bargaining power, I use counterfactual simulations to calculate changes in 
private label market shares, prices and consumer welfare under a variety of alternative 
assumptions.  
The simulation is intended to determine whether higher levels of bargaining 
power result in lower private label market shares. Bargaining power is assumed to be 
exogenous, and hence parametric to the decisions made by all agents. Therefore, I vary 
the conduct parameter introduced in the equilibrium pricing model, and calculate the 
resulting impact on manufacturers’ and retailers’ margins, and private label market 
shares. The first scenario assumes a market where manufacturers have no bargaining 
power. Here, I restrict 𝜃 to 0 and assume that manufacturers and retailers set prices as 
perfectly competitive firms. I also conduct a simulation in which I assume that 
manufacturers price more competitively than Bertrand-Nash competition by restricting 
𝜃 to 0.5. Last, I simulate results for markets where manufacturers price exactly as 
Bertrand-Nash, and more cooperatively than Bertrand-Nash by setting  (𝜃 = 1) and (𝜃 =
2), respectively.  I describe the data used to test this model, and my estimation 
procedures, in the next section.  
Data 
Bread is one of the largest selling products in emerging economies (Euromonitor 2013). 
In South Africa, bread accounts for the majority of sales in the baked goods category 
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because it is a staple item for nearly all households, regardless of income. Bread 
manufacturing in South Africa is very dominated by a few manufacturers. There are four 
major bakeries: Blue Ribbon Bakeries, which is owned by Premier Foods; Albany 
Bakeries, which is owned by Tiger Consumer Brands; Sasko and Duens Bakeries, which 
are subsidiaries of Pioneer Foods, and Sunbake Bakeries, which is controlled by 
Foodcorp. Together, these firms control more than 90% of the market, while the rest is 
served by smaller independent bakeries. In contrast the top four bread manufacturers in 
the US – Flowers Food Inc, Grupo Bimbo SAB de CV, Sara Lee Corporation and 
Campbell Soup Company have a combined market share of less than 15% (Euromonitor 
2014). In South Africa, the leading manufacturers are all vertically integrated,  operating 
milling companies that control over 90 % of all milled wheat, which is the main 
ingredient used to bake bread. The manufacturers sell their bread to retailers, general 
traders, and independent agents. Large retailers are the largest customers, which purchase 
more than 60% of all production. The remainder is sold to smaller entities such as cafes, 
truck shops, smaller retailers and independent distributors (Mncube 2013). 
The bread retail market is also dominated by a few players.  The four-firm 
concentration ratio (CR4) is approximately 84.3%, and the market is controlled by five 
major players, Pick n Pay, Woolworths, Shoprite, Spar, and Walmart’s subsidiary, 
Cambridge Foods. Although the market is dominated by national brands, each of the 
retailers except Cambridge Foods sells a private label. The bread market has four leading 
brands Albany, Sasko, Blue Ribbon and Sunbake. Private labels are one of the lowest 
selling brands in this category and have a combined market share of 5.3% (see table 8).  
In contrast, US private labels account for about 14% of all bread sales (Euromonitor 
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2014). In South Africa, Pioneer Foods is the largest manufacturer, followed by Tiger 
Brands, Premier Foods, and Foodcorp.  
Table 1, Brand and Manufacturer Market Shares (%) 
 
Brand  
 
 
Manufacturer 
 
 
Market 
Share 
(%) 
 
Av. 
Price 
(ZAR) 
 
Brand 1   Tiger Brands  6.80 11.83 
Brand 2 Premier Foods Plc 3.79 9.15 
Brand 3 Tiger Brands 3.69 10.77 
Brand 4   Pioneer Food Group Ltd 5.98 9.81 
Brand 5 Pioneer Food Group Ltd 1.76 8.84 
Brand 6  Premier Foods Plc 1.41 8.91 
Brand 7    Pioneer Food Group Ltd 1.24 8.22 
Brand 8    Tiger Brands 1.10 12.53 
Brand 9 Foodcorp (Pty) Ltd 1.74 8.48 
Brand 10     Tiger Brands 0.73 8.30 
Brand 11      Pioneer Food Group Ltd 1.24 8.20 
Brand 12    Tiger Brands 0.57 11.77 
 
To test my principal hypothesis I use nationally-representative, a panel data set 
gathered by Nielsen (Homescan). The data includes a comprehensive set of retailers and 
brands, and tracks South African households between August 2013 and June 2014. 
Consistent with household-panel data sets elsewhere, households in the panel keep 
shopping diaries in which they record their biweekly purchases of all grocery items. The 
data describes the main characteristics of their purchases: quantity, brand, store, price and 
date of purchase. 
For current purposes, I use purchases from the five leading retailers – 
Woolworths, Pick n Pay, Spar, Shoprite and Cambridge Foods. Together these purchases 
account for 80.5% of sales in the sample. I also use purchases from six leading national 
brands (four white and two brown bread brands) and six private labels (four white and 
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two brown bread brands). Purchases of these twelve brands account for about 85.8% of 
the sales for the five retailers in my sample.  
Input prices are required to estimate the cost of producing and retailing bread.  
Electricity prices are from Eskom. Electricity is mainly used to power the high capacity 
commercial ovens used by the manufacturers. The data on wheat-flour prices is from 
South African Grain Information Service (SAGIS).  I acquire data on wheat prices from 
SAFEX. Wheat-flour is the most important ingredient in baking bread, accounting for 41 
% of the total cost (Mncube 2010). Marginal cost also includes fuel prices from South 
Africa (Stats SA) as petrol and diesel are key components of distribution costs. Last, I 
acquire data on manufacturing wages from the South African Department of Labor. Table 
2 reports summary statistics for these variables 
Table 2, Summary Statistics for the Input Variables. 
 
Variable  
 
 
Units  
 
Mean 
 
SD 
 
Min 
 
Max 
Petrol R/Liter 13.554 0.485 12.843 14.163 
Diesel R/Liter 12.895 0.331 12.484 13.432 
Wheat R/Ton 3701.254 240.069 3301 41903 
Flour R/Kg 9.324 0.715 8.6233 10.622 
Electricity R/Kwh 0.505 0.049 0.4132 0.592 
Labor R/Month 2960.971 74.205 2359.410 3480.821 
 
Estimation  
There are a number of issues to address when estimating the demand (9) and supply 
models (23). First, when estimating the demand model, some potentially-important 
product characteristics (e.g. advertising, promotions and shelf placement) may have been 
omitted in the specification of utility, but are likely correlated with the price paid by 
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consumers. The resulting endogeneity results in bias if not addressed.  I follow Petrin and 
Train (2010) and estimate a control function to address the endogeneity of prices.  
A control function is a supplementary regression in which the potentially-
endogenous variable is regressed on set of exogenous instruments. The error from this 
regression is, by definition, the component of price variation that is orthogonal to the 
instruments.   By including the error in the demand equation, the model is essentially 
purged of any remaining endogeneity. The control function is written as:  
𝑝𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿𝐽𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑊𝑗𝑡 + 𝜆𝑟 + 𝜂𝑗𝑡 ,                                               (18) 
where 𝑝𝑗𝑡the price of bread is,  𝐽𝑗𝑡  is a vectors of product characteristics, 𝑊𝑗𝑡 is a vector 
of possible cost shifters, 𝜆 is a retailer dummy and 𝜂𝑗𝑡  is an iid error-term.  
For the product characteristics I include a dummy indicating whether the product 
is a private label of national brand and a binary indicator of whether the bread is brown or 
white. For supply-shifters, similar to Draganska and Jain (2005), and Bonnet and Dubois 
(2010) I use factor price series of wheat, flour, labor and electricity. These inputs are 
appropriate instruments because manufacturers' input prices are uncorrelated with 
unobserved demand shocks. Further, I interact the input prices with product dummies 
which allows each input to enter the production function of each product differently 
(Villas Boas 2006). This is a reasonable assumption as each bread is likely to use inputs 
in different proportion, depending upon the type of bread, the type of production process 
used, and the amount of transportation involved in moving it to market. I test the 
relevance of my instrumental variables with a first stage F-test (Stagier and Stock 1997). 
I conclude that they are relevant as the F-statistic of 75,033.23 is sufficiently high. 
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I then substitute the residual retained from equation (18) into the utility function, 
equation (1) to obtain the following: 
𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑋𝑗𝑡𝛽𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝜏?̂?𝑗𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡,                              (19) 
Maintaining the assumption that 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is iid extreme value I distributed, I can write the 
conditional probability 𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡 for consumer 𝑖 of buying product 𝑗 in period 𝑡, i.e. 𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡  >
𝑈𝑖𝑘𝑡, ∀𝑘 ≠ 𝑗, as: 
𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑡(𝛼𝑖, 𝛽𝑖) =
exp (𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑡)
1 + ∑ exp (𝑉𝑖𝑘𝑡)
𝑗
𝑘=1
  ,                          (20) 
where 𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑋𝑗𝑡 − 𝛼𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝜏𝜂𝑗𝑡𝐼 assume that (𝑣𝑖
𝛼 , 𝑣𝑖
𝛽
) are independent and let 𝑓 denote 
the standard normal probability distribution function. The unconditional probability of 
observing the sequence of 𝑇 choices made by consumer 𝑖 is then: 
𝑃𝑖(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜎
𝛼 , 𝜎𝛽) = ∫(∏𝐿𝑖𝑗(𝑖,𝑡)𝑡(𝛼𝑖, 𝛽𝑖)
𝑇
𝑡=1
)𝑓(𝛼𝑖|𝛼, 𝜎
𝛼)𝑓(𝛽𝑖|𝛽, 𝜎
𝛽)𝑑𝛼𝑖𝑑𝛽𝑖       (21) 
where 𝑗(𝑖, 𝑡) is the alternative chosen by consumer 𝑖 in period 𝑡, 𝑓(𝛼𝑖|𝛼, 𝜎
𝛼) and 
𝑓(𝛽𝑖|𝛽, 𝜎
𝛽) are the p.d.f of the random coefficients 𝛼𝑖and 𝛽𝑖 respectively, and are 
assumed independent. Given that there is no analytical solution to the integral in equation 
(8) I use simulated maximum likelihood to estimate the model parameters (Train 2009), 
maximizing: 
𝑆𝐿𝐿(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜎𝛼 , 𝜎𝛽) =∑In [
1
𝑅
∑(∏𝐿𝑖𝑗(𝑖,𝑡)𝑡(𝛼
𝑟 , 𝛽𝑟)
𝑇
𝑡=1
)
𝑅
𝑟=1
]        (22)        
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
with respect to the coefficients(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜎𝛼 , 𝜎𝛽) and where 𝑅 is the number of simulations, 
𝛼𝑟 and 𝛽𝑟 are the 𝑟𝑡ℎ Halton draws of the distributions 𝑓(𝛼𝑖|𝛼, 𝜎
𝛼) and 𝑓(𝛽𝑖|𝛽, 𝜎
𝛽) 
respectively.  
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For the vertical supply model I estimate two separate models, First, I estimate the 
model of horizontal competition alone (among retailers) in order to show how retail 
margins behave for private labels and national brands if manufacturer conduct is not 
taken into account. Second, I estimate the model that includes both retailers’ and 
manufacturers’ margins. 
However, prior to estimation, I test the endogeneity of the both the retailer 
margins and the manufacturer margins using the Wu-Hausman test (Wu 1974; Hausman 
1978). The Wu-Hausman statistic is formed by selecting ordinary least squares (OLS) as 
the efficient estimator and the instrumental variable (IV) as the inefficient but consistent 
estimator. Thus, it is a test of the consequence of employing different estimation methods 
on the same equation. The Wu-Hausman statistic in both my models (the one with retail 
margins only (𝜒2 (7.09), 𝑝 < 0.0311) and the one with retail and manufacturer margins 
(𝜒2 (8.08) 𝑝 < 0.0326) show that the margins are endogenous. Therefore, I use 
generalized methods of moments (GMM) to estimate the vertical supply models. In a 
GMM environment, identification on the supply side requires instruments that are 
correlated with the endogenous variables but not the unobservables in the pricing 
equation. 
 Following Villas-Boas (2007), I use a set of store and product dummy variables 
as instruments. These dummies allow demand to differ across the geographical regions 
represented in my data and account for distinctive unobservable supply factors. I also 
include a set of lagged prices in order to account for any predetermined pricing effects.  
Again, I test for the relevance of my instrumental variables. For both models I 
reject the hypothesis that my instrumental variable are not relevant as my first-stage F-
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statistics are relatively high, 6,580.47 for the retail margin and 27.32 for the wholesale 
margin. I also test the exogeneity of the instrumental variables following Hansen (1982). 
For the retail margins only model the J-statistic of (8.965, 𝑝 < 0.111) implies that the 
IV’s are indeed exogenous. For the model with retail and manufacturer margins, the J-
statistic of (9.293, 𝑝 < 0.097) also suggests that my IV’s here are exogenous. 
Estimating the demand and pricing models simultaneously is beneficial in terms 
of estimation efficiency, but I estimate them sequentially due to the complexity of the 
cross-equation restrictions between the demand parameters and supply variables.  I use 
estimates from the demand model to estimate the pricing model, conditional on the 
demand estimates.  This estimation procedure is widely accepted in the literature and 
produces results that are similar to those obtained with simultaneous estimation (Villas-
Boas and Zhao 2005). The results of my model are presented in the next section.  
Results and Discussion  
In this section I first present the demand-system estimates, followed by specification tests 
of the pricing model, and estimates from the preferred pricing model. Specifically, for the 
pricing model I present estimates from a number of variants of the model in order to 
examine the robustness of my specification, and estimation method. As a specification 
test for the  supply-side model I first present a model that only includes retailer margins, 
followed by second model that includes both retail (downstream) and manufacturer 
(upstream) margins. Last, I present findings derived from the counterfactual simulations, 
and how these inform my hypothesis regarding the relationship between manufacturer 
bargaining power and private label market share.  
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Demand Results 
As a first step in interpreting the demand model results I conduct a series of specification 
tests to determine whether my maintained model is preferred to a number of logical 
alternatives. Accounting for unobserved heterogeneity through the random parameter 
logit model is only necessary, or desirable, if heterogeneity is indeed a feature of the data. 
I conduct two types of specification tests. First, a likelihood ratio (LR) test is appropriate 
because a simple-logit model is nested within the more general random parameter 
specification. Second, simple t-tests of the random parameters are used to determine 
whether heterogeneity with respect to individual parameters is important. The standard 
deviations of price (t-statistic, 9.983) and income (t-statistic, 2.882) parameters had 
significant t-statistics. Moreover, the significance of these parameters in the random 
parameter model supports this specification over a constant parameter alternative.  
With respect to the LR test, the estimated Chi-square value for the test is 
3,762.39, while the critical Chi-square value with 5 degrees of freedom at the 5% level of 
significance is 11.074. Therefore, I reject the fixed parameter model in favor of the 
random-parameter alternative.  I conclude that the random parameter model is preferred 
to the constant parameter version, so use this version to interpret the demand results.  
Table 3 shows the estimated demand side parameters. The price coefficient is 
negative as expected (-0.420) and has a statistically significant standard deviation (0.474) 
implying that households seem to vary substantially with respect to their marginal utility 
of income. On average, national brands are preferred over private labels. The estimates 
show that consumers prefer national brands (brand 1 to brand 6) as compared to private 
labels (brand 7 to brand 12). Also, consumers prefer white bread over brown bread (-
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0.324). The preference for brown bread is also heterogeneous across the different 
households. With respect to observed heterogeneity, higher incomes seems to increase 
price sensitivity.  
Table 3. Random Coefficient Logit Demand Estimates 
  
Non-Random Parameter Model 
 
 
Random Parameter Model 
 
 
Estimate  Standard Error Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Brand 1  6.684* 0.684 6.655* 0.701 
Brand 2 6.091* 0.684 6.300* 0.701 
Brand 3 5.889* 0.684 5.536* 0.703 
Brand 4 5.753* 0.684 5.755* 0.702 
Brand 5 5.554* 0.685 5.758* 0.701 
Brand 6 5.532* 0.685 5.836* 0.701 
Brand 7 5.128* 0.685 5.450* 0.701 
Brand 8 4.833* 0.685 5.043* 0.702 
Brand 9 4.722* 0.685 5.043* 0.702 
Brand 10 4.929* 0.685 5.25* 0.702 
Brand 11 4.973* 0.685 5.236* 0.702 
Income 0.003* 0.001 0.001* 0.001 
Household 
Size -0.023 0.031 -0.012 0.032 
Brown -0.324* 0.436 -0.212* 0.046 
Price  -0.392* 0.063 -0.420* 0.065 
CF -0.385* 0.064 -0.416* 0.066 
   Standard Deviation of Price Parameter  
Price   0.474* 0.048 
Income   0.001* 0.000 
Household 
Size   0.008* 0.014 
Brown   0.345* 0.059 
LLF -56258.34  -54377.17       
Chi-square 644.076   15674.87        
* 𝑝 < 0.05 
 
Table 4 provides the entire matrix of own-and cross price elasticities. All the 
estimates have expected signs. The average own-price effect is negative (as expected) 
and highly significant. The estimate of -3.632 suggests that bread in the South African 
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market is elastic which is reasonable, given that bread is highly differentiated. However, 
private labels seem to be more price sensitive (-3.987) to changes in prices than national 
brands (-3.187). The elasticities estimates also show that there is considerable brand-
preference as the highlighted by the low cross price elasticities. Furthermore, the cross 
price elasticities highlight that private labels are weak substitutes for each other whereas 
national brands are strong substitutes for each other. The elasticity estimates are also 
similar to estimates from other emerging countries. For example, the price elasticity of 
bread in Brazil is -3.8 (Byerlee and Sain 2001), in Turkey it is -2.65 (Tekguc 2011), and -
2.53 in China (Zhou 2012).  In contrast, price elasticity of bread in developed economies 
is much higher. For example, Bergtold, Akobundu, and Peterson (2004) find that in 
Canada the own-price elasticity of demand for both brown and white bread is less 
responsive to changes in price (elasticities of -0.78 and -0.81, respectively). Similarly, 
Okrent and Alston (2012) find that in the US the unconditional demand for bread is 
relatively high, -0.59 for brown bread and -1.54 for white bread. I present the results from 
my pricing model next.
  
 
 
3
8 
  
 
Table 4. Own and Cross Price Elasticity Matrix 
  
 
National Brands 
 
 
 
Private Labels 
 
 
Brand 1 Brand 2 Brand 3 Brand 4 Brand 5 Brand 6 Brand 7 Brand 8 Brand 9 Brand 10 Brand 11 
Brand 1 -2.389 0.4241 0.381 0.315 0.258 0.247 0.168 0.123 0.112 0.138 0.139 
Brand 2 0.826 -3.483 0.445 0.425 0.360 0.348 0.237 0.173 0.158 0.195 0.196 
Brand 3 0.703 0.452 -2.845 0.340 0.275 0.262 0.178 0.231 0.319 0.147 0.148 
Brand 4 0.804 0.553 0.419 -3.442 0.337 0.324 0.221 0.162 0.147 0.381 0.182 
Brand 5 0.841 0.601 0.448 0.433 -3.779 0.356 0.242 0.077 0.161 0.199 0.470 
Brand 6 0.846 0.617 0.455 0.441 0.378 -3.869 0.249 0.182 0.245 0.205 0.206 
Brand 7 0.736 0.575 0.765 0.441 0.378 0.366 -3.986 0.182 0.166 0.316 0.086 
Brand 8 0.847 0.613 0.451 0.440 0.375 0.364 0.247 -4.034 0.165 0.203 0.205 
Brand 9 0.576 0.617 0.495 0.441 0.378 0.366 0.368 0.182 -4.070 0.205 0.316 
Brand 10 0.846 0.505 0.658 0.441 0.378 0.367 0.249 0.182 0.166 -4.031 0.206 
Brand 11 0.635 0.616 0.454 0.441 0.377 0.366 0.289 0.382 0.166 0.205 -4.026 
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Bargaining Power Results 
These high price elasticities of demand suggest that retail margins in the bread market will be 
generally low. With smaller margins, the allocation of value between manufacturer and retailer 
becomes even more critical as there is less to share. The primary parameters of interest in the 
pricing model are 𝜙 and 𝜃, the conduct parameters that determine how the total margin is 
allocated among players in the bread supply chain. I start by estimating horizontal 
competition alone (among retailers) in order to show how retail margins behave for 
private labels and national brands if manufacturer conduct is not taken into account. 
Estimates of this model are shown in Table 5. I then estimate the model that includes 
both retailers’ and manufacturers’ margins; the results from that model are shown in 
Table 6. 
In the model that only includes retailer margins I find that, in general retailers 
price significantly below the level implied by Bertrand-Nash competition, but above the 
perfectly competitive level (𝜙 = 0.96). In contrast, retailers in developed economies 
mostly price in excess of purely competitive levels (Meza and Sudhir 2010) which may 
explain differences in private label market shares. In terms of the cost elements I find that 
electricity prices, labor prices and fuel prices (diesel and petrol) significantly explain 
retail price of breads. However, the likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic of 35.05 ( 𝑝 <
0.001) shows that adding manufacturer margins results in a statistically significant 
improvement in model fit. Therefore, a more comprehensive picture is given by the 
estimates of the model that introduces manufacturer margins and vertical competition.  
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Table 5. Retail Margin Model: Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
Estimates  
  
Least Squares Model 
 
GMM 
  
  Estimate  Standard 
Error 
Estimate Standard 
Error 
Electricity -14.734* 3.693 -7.742  5.900 
Labor 9.695* 2.359 -13.261  7.186 
Diesel 10.830* 1.007 11.148* 1.718 
Brand 1 0.062  0.269 1.386  1.014 
Brand 2 -1.998* 0.271 -0.697  0.997 
Brand 3 -0.698* 0.270 0.551  0.997 
Brand 4 -1.632* 0.269 -0.346  0.971 
Brand 5 -2.423* 0.269 -1.018  0.982 
Brand 6 -2.485* 0.269 -1.073*  0.977 
Brand 7 -2.993* 0.336 -1.551  1.083 
Brand 9 -2.656* 0.336 -1.234* 1.032 
Brand 10 -3.172* 0.336 -1.755*  0.994 
Brand 11 -2.941* 0.336 -1.448  1.082 
Brand 12 -0.177  0.339 1.056  1.099 
 
0.286* 0.152 0.962* 0.330 
LR   35.05 
7.09 Chi-square   
* 𝑝 < 0.05 
 
From this model, I find that retailers price below implied Bertrand-Nash 
competition (𝜙 = 0.77) but above the perfectly competitive levels. This estimate is 
qualitatively similar to the estimate from the model that does not include manufacturers.  
Once more, the cost elements show that labor costs, diesel prices and fuel prices explain 
bread prices. Importantly, I find that manufacturers price in excess of purely competitive 
levels, and that they earn margins greater than those implied by Bertrand-Nash 
competition (𝜃 = 1.73), implying that they have a considerable degree of bargaining 
𝜙 
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power. Taking into account that the South African bread market is dominated by a few 
manufacturers, this is not an unexpected result.  Because I cannot directly test this either 
hypothesis ventured above, I conduct counterfactual simulations under alternative 
bargaining power supply assumptions. The results of these simulations are presented in 
Table 7.  
Table 6. Retail and Wholesale Margin Model: Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) Estimates  
  
Least Squares Model 
 
GMM 
  
  Estimate  Standard 
Error 
Estimate Standard 
Error 
Electricity -26.705* 5.176 -2.821*  22.348 
Labor 11.942* 2.403 -10.233*  9.380 
Fuel 10.952* 0.983 2.634*  14.749 
Wheat-Flour 49.870* 15.662 10.975* 79.975 
Brand 1 -0.092  0.264 0.399  0.520 
Brand 2 -2.165* 0.266 -1.585* 0.517 
Brand 3 -0.820* 0.265 -0.348  0.515 
Brand 4 -1.744* 0.263 -1.188* 0.498 
Brand 5 -2.544* 0.263 -1.831* 0.506 
Brand 6 -2.632* 0.264 -1.952* 0.505 
Brand 7 -3.136* 0.329 -2.572* 0.586 
Brand 9 -2.692* 0.328 -1.878* 0.571 
Brand 10 -3.326* 0.329 -2.656* 0.517 
Brand 11 -3.044* 0.328 -2.238* 0.641 
Brand 12 -0.327  0.333 0.716  1.053 
 
0.348* 0.149 0.777* 0.255 
 
1.063* 0.213 1.731* 0.361 
LR    48.21 
Chi-square    8.08 
* 𝑝 < 0.05 
 
Table 7 shows results of the counterfactual scenario in which I examine whether 
higher levels of manufacturer bargaining power result in low private label market shares. 
𝜙 
𝜃 
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In this counterfactual I exogenously vary manufacturer bargaining power (𝜃) and 
calculate the resulting effects. Specifically, I estimate changes in market shares, 
wholesale prices, retailer and manufacturer margins, and retail prices when both 
manufacturers and retailers set prices as perfectly competitive firms i.e. when (𝜃 = 0), 
when manufacturers price more competitively than Bertrand-Nash competition i.e. when 
(𝜃 = 0.5), when manufacturers price at than Bertrand-Nash manufacturers i.e. when 
(𝜃 = 1) and when they price more cooperatively than Bertrand-Nash i.e. when (𝜃 = 2).  
I find that at when (𝜃 = 0) private label market shares increase. The average 
market shares of private labels (brands 7 to 11) increases by  10.57%  with brands 7 and 9 
(the most popular private labels) gaining  the most market share.  In contrast, national 
brands lose market shares, the average loss is -0.57%. The results also show that as 
manufacturer bargaining power increases private label market shares decrease, whereas 
national brand market shares increase. As a matter of fact, private label market shares are 
lowest and national brand market shares are highest when manufacturers price more 
cooperatively than Bertrand-Nash competition i.e. when (𝜃 > 1).  
In terms of wholesale prices, I find that when the industry conduct is identical to 
perfect competition both private label and national brand wholesale prices decline, as 
expected. However, the decline is more prominent in private labels. Moreover, as 
manufacturer power increases, private label wholesale prices increase faster than national 
brand wholesale prices. For example, the wholesale price of brand 7 (the best-selling 
private label) increases by 13.72% when (𝜃 = 2), whereas, the wholesale price of brand 5 
(the best-selling national brand) increases by 9.83%. Given that,  private label market 
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shares are low when wholesale prices are high and that they are high when wholesale 
prices are low,  these results imply that low private label market shares in emerging 
markets may be due to dominant manufacturers setting relatively high private label 
wholesale prices.   
Under perfectly competitive market conditions, the decrease in private label retail 
prices is greater than that of national brands. Private label prices decline by an average of 
5.21%, whereas national brand prices decline by an average of 2.78%. Nonetheless, both 
increase with manufacturer bargaining power. I also find that when (𝜃 = 0), 
manufacturer margins on both private and national brands decrease and increase when 
manufactures price above competitive levels (𝜃 > 0). In contrast, retailer margins on 
both private labels and national brands decline at higher values of 𝜃, albeit the decline is 
highest in private labels.   
In general, my results highlight that high manufacturer power (𝜃 > 1), leads not 
only to low private label market shares, but also to high private label wholesale prices 
suggesting that in equilibrium national brand manufacturers set relatively high wholesale 
prices on private labels. I also find that, retail prices on private labels rise and as such 
private labels margins are lower.  This confirms that even though retailers earn relatively 
low margins on private labels they still earn relatively high margins from national brands, 
such that the two margins are in equilibrium. Importantly, this gives retailers no 
incentives to enter the private label manufacturing market. Consequently, these results 
imply that low private label market shares in emerging markets may be due to dominant 
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manufacturers setting relatively high private label wholesale prices in an effort to deter 
retailers from pursuing private label programs. 
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Conclusion  
This study examines why private label market shares are growing at lower rates in 
developing economies than developed economies.  In particular, I investigate the 
possibility that low private label market shares may be an artifact of relatively 
manufacturing sector. Because manufacturers produce both national brands and private 
labels, there are fundamental economic incentives that prevent retailers from expanding 
the role of private labels as they do in markets with relatively less-powerful 
manufacturers. Evidently, the manufacturer-retailer relationship favors manufacturers, 
allowing them to set relatively high wholesale prices on private labels, which in turn 
leads to high private label retail prices, and low private label market shares. Importantly, 
my results generalize beyond the markets and the product category considered here. The 
findings provide more general insights into manufacturer-retailer relationships. That is 
we, show that national brand manufacturers with bargaining power can influence not only 
private label market shares but also retail prices of both national brands and private 
labels. 
The implications for practitioners are also important. Taking into account that, I 
find that when manufacturer bargaining power is low, private labels market shares and 
retailer margins are high, if retailers can attenuate manufacturer bargaining power by 
either producing their own private labels or by partnering with contract manufacturers it 
may increase private label market shares and subsequently their overall profits. On the 
other hand manufactures earn higher margins by producing both their own brands and 
private labels, so are not likely to change the status quo. 
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The results also highlight that when manufacturer bargaining power is low, 
overall retail prices are low as well. This finding has clear implications for consumers, in 
that expansion of private labels can aid households in developing economies to fight food 
insecurity. Evidence points to the fact that food prices are higher in the least developed 
countries of the world as compared to the wealthier nations, thus, they can benefit from 
less expensive food.    
As with most research, my research is also subject to limitations despite its 
contribution to some interesting findings. The primary limitation of my research is that I 
use data from the South African market only. Although there are overt similarities in the 
private label markets among South Africa and most emerging economies, examination of 
data from several other countries will improve the generalizability of my findings, 
therefore, this is an area that future studies can look at. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 48 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
RETAILERS’ PRIVATE LABEL MARKET SHARE, THE ROLE OF PRIVATE 
LABEL PORTFOLIO STRATEGIES AND BRAND SIMILARITY. 
 
Abstract 
Retailers commonly manage their private labels as part of a portfolio. That is, they own 
and market more than one brand at a time. In the past, a majority of retailers in emerging 
markets either carried a single brand or many undifferentiated brands (no distinct quality 
tiers) in their private label portfolios. This, however, is no longer the case, as now more 
retailers follow a tiered, value-added scheme. However, the price gap between some of 
the retailers’ private labels in different quality tiers is very small. In fact there are times 
economy and medium-quality private labels are priced more than high-quality brand 
alternatives. I examine the effects of this pricing strategy on private label market shares. I 
find that the price-gap contributes to perceived brand similarity so that when the gap is 
small customers cannot distinguish between brands in different price-quality tiers. This 
results in increased intraportfolio competition and subsequently cannibalization between 
brands. Importantly, I find that high brand similarity negatively impacts private label 
market shares. 
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Introduction  
In most emerging markets, retailers carry a portfolio of private labels within a product 
category in order to target different price-quality tiers. For example, leading South 
African retailers such as Checkers, Spar and Pick n Pay offer portfolios that consist of 
three private labels, targeting premium quality, standard quality and economical shoppers 
at three different price-quality points2. Cannibalization is a natural outcome of this 
strategy, which can occur across tiers, particularly when consumers cannot differentiate 
upper-tier from low-tier brands. In this chapter, I examine whether the price-gap between 
private labels in different tiers impacts perceived brand similarity, and subsequently, 
private label market shares.   
Offering private label portfolios has become a key strategy for most retailers. For 
example, In 2010, roughly 75 % of all major food retailers carried quality-differentiated 
private label portfolios, compared to less than 50% in 2007 (Planet Retail  2012). 
Evidently, this “good,” “better,” and “best” portfolio strategy has gained popularity 
among retailers, yet, there is little research offering a rigorous explanation for the 
existence of private label portfolios. Theoretical and empirical research on private labels 
mainly emphasizes the role of standard private labels, and provides limited empirical 
insight into the concurrent roles of premium or economy private labels (Ailawadi and 
Keller 2004). Among the few studies that do, Geyskens, Gielens, and Gijsbrechts, (2010) 
show how introducing economy and premium private labels affects not only national 
brand choices, but also preferences for incumbent private labels. In a related study, 
                                                          
2 For example, Pick n Pay, offers “Finest” a premium brand, “PnP” a standard quality brand and “No 
name” a value brand, across multiple grocery categories. 
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Braak, Dekimpe, and Geyskens (2014) find that retailers employ multi-tiered portfolios 
to expand their overall margins. Further, they show that premium private labels offer 
higher margins than standard and economy private labels, but only when they are 
manufactured by suppliers who are knowledgeable about national brands. But, neither of 
these studies consider how retailers’ pricing strategies, in particular the price-gap 
between brands in different quality tiers, impacts cross-brand sales among private labels 
within a portfolio.  
Examining cross-brand effects reveals how intra-category private label strategies 
can affect retailers’ margins and overall private label market shares. Researchers typically 
assume that consumers can differentiate between brands in different quality-tiers. Rather, 
the evidence regarding consumers’ bounded-rationality in grocery decision-making, 
particularly given the complexity of filling an entire shopping basket with items, is well 
understood (Dickson and Sawyer 1990; Jensen et al 2014). In this essay, I consider the 
possibility that consumers may not be able to differentiate between private labels in 
different quality-tiers, especially when the price-gap is narrow and, when prices, which 
are strong signals of quality, frequently overlap among price tiers (see figure 2)3. 
 
 
 
                                                          
3  For example, Pick n Pay, offers “Finest” a premium brand, “PnP” a standard quality brand and “No 
name” a value brand, across multiple grocery categories. 
For Spar, SaveMor is the economy private label and Spar is the standard private label (Series 1 and 2). For 
Pick n Pay, No Name is the economy private label and Pick n Pay is the standard private label (Series 3 and 
4). 
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Figure 2.  Average Brand Portfolio Prices– 46 week 
 
A narrow price-gap among brands in a portfolio may be deliberate or unintended. 
For example, intense price competition within a product category may result in an 
unintended narrow price-gap between upper-tier and low-tier private labels. Usually, in 
order to attract “no frills” consumers, low-tier private labels are priced closer to marginal 
cost, whereas upper-tier private labels have higher margins. However, when price 
competition is intense, to compete effectively retailers are likely to promote upper-tier 
private labels, which results in a narrow price-gap between the brands. Although each 
retailer would rather not maintain such a narrow price gap, it is well understood that 
oligopoly retailers fail to internalize pricing externalities that affect the demand for their 
rivals’ products (Richards and Hamilton 2016). As a result, competitive interactions on 
the inter-retailer margin force private label price gaps to be lower than they would if 
retailers priced as monopolists.   
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In emerging markets, a narrow price-gap among brands may also occur because 
of manufacturer power. In most emerging economies private labels are procured from 
national brand manufacturers (Song  2011; Beneke  2009; Van Wyk  2013) suggesting 
that manufacturers can influence the retail price of private labels (Pasirayi 2016). This 
limits the retailer’s degree of flexibility in that they can only compete with national 
brands on attributes, and not undercut prices.  Consequently, private label portfolios are 
forced, into a narrow price-band closer to national brand prices.  
Manufacturer bargaining power may also explain why the price-gap between 
retailers’ private label tiers is relatively larger in developed economies as compared to 
emerging markets retailers.  In developed economies, retailers set the prices for the 
private labels generally in excess of purely competitive levels, suggesting they have 
bargaining power vis-à-vis manufacturers (Morton and Zettelmeyer  2004; Meza and 
Sudhir  2010). Retailer bargaining power implies that they have more control over the 
positioning of their store brands, and, importantly, are able to offer a wider price range 
for their private labels.  
On the other hand, retailers may deliberately offer low-tier private labels at prices 
that are closer to the upper-tier brands so as to maximize profits. Prior research finds that 
the price knowledge among consumers is imperfect. In fact, a majority of consumers 
form impressions of prices rather than actually attending to exact prices (Oxenfeldt 1966; 
Kalyanaram and Little 1994).  For example, Dickson and Sawyer (1990) and Jensen et al 
(2014) find that, in a grocery retail setting, consumers tend to spend a relatively small 
amount of time making their selection, and a substantial number do not thoroughly check 
prices of their items or alternative brands. Moreover, consumers use “references prices,” 
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or prices that they think the retail prices should be, and compare those to observed prices 
to (Winer 1986; Gupta and Cooper 1992; Kalwani and Yim 1992; Kalyanaram and Little 
1994; Han, Gupta, and Lehmann 2001; Terui and Dahana 2006). Reference prices 
typically reflect a range of recalled price experiences to set lower and upper bounds of 
price expectations. Thus, the attractiveness of an observed price is a function of its 
location in the range, and consumers will buy the product if the price falls within the 
range of their reference price. Reference-price behavior suggests that consumers rarely 
pay close attention to the actual price of a product, making them highly susceptible to 
retailer pricing strategies.  
Regardless of source, I argue that a narrow price-gap between private labels in 
different tiers results in high perceived brand similarity, which in turn leads to 
cannibalization, and low private label market shares. The Principle of Maximum 
Differentiation (d’Aspremont et al 1979) can explain why private label market shares 
decrease with brand similarity. The more usual Principle of Minimum Differentiation 
(Hotelling 1929) implies that two differentiated products offered to a group of consumers 
with homogeneous tastes will be only slightly differentiated in order to divide the market 
in half. In contrast, d’Aspremont et al (1979) show that the Hotelling equilibrium is, in 
fact, unstable, and that an equilibrium in which sellers maximally differentiate is more 
likely. As a result, the Principle of Maximum Differentiation states that an equilibrium in 
differentiated product markets occurs when the products are highly differentiated i.e. 
when the products are located further away from each other (Irmen and Thisse 1998; 
Rajan and Sinha 2009).  Importantly, in a maximum differentiation equilibrium, 
differentiated products located further from others in attribute space can have a positive 
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effect on market shares as they appeal to consumers’ demands for variety (Ansari, 
Economides and Ghosh 1994; Anderson, Fornell and Lehmann 1994). Moreover, optimal 
assortment models find that market shares are positive when products are located far 
from each other in attribute space, with no substitution between products in the 
assortment (Gaur and Honhon  2006; Misra 2008). Therefore, when private labels within 
the portfolio are not maximally differentiated it may negatively impact market shares.   
I investigate the impact of brand similarity on private label market shares using 
breakfast cereal sales data from a major South African retail market. I analyze the data 
using a distance-metric nested logit demand system (Pinkse, Slade, and Brett 2002; Slade 
2004; Pofahl and Richards 2009) that allows brand similarity to shift demand, and 
thereby change private label shares relative to other, national, brands.  In the model I test 
whether a narrow price-gap between brands in different tiers impacts brand similarity and 
how this impacts private label brand market shares.  Thereafter, I conduct counterfactual 
simulations to determine how the level of brand similarity impacts private label market 
shares.  
My results provide a unique perspective on the effects of brand similarity on 
intra-brand portfolio competition, cannibalization and private label market shares. Most 
importantly, I find that, within a private label brand portfolio, consumers have a 
preference for brands that are dissimilar as market shares fall the closer one brand is to 
another. This result is consistent with the Principle of Maximum Differentiation. This 
maximum differentiation outcome explains why I observe a reduction in market shares 
when upper-tier and low-tier private labels are similar to each other. I also find that a 
narrow price-gap leads to high intra-portfolio competition, and cannibalization between 
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upper-tier and low-tier private labels. Taken together, these results suggest that retailers’ 
private label portfolio strategies may, in part, explain the relatively low private label 
market shares in emerging economies. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In the next section I 
develop the research framework. Here, I describe private label portfolios and specify how 
the price-gap through brand similarity impacts private label market shares. In the third 
section, I develop an econometric model of retail breakfast cereal demand.  I explain how 
the model is estimated in the fourth section. In the fifth section, I describe the South 
African breakfast cereal market, and provide some descriptive statistics that highlight key 
price and market share trends. In a sixth section, I present the econometric results, and 
test the core hypotheses of brand similarity and cannibalization.  The final section 
consists of a discussion of the results, some conclusions, and key managerial 
implications. 
Private Label Portfolios 
Many retailers have a portfolio of private labels. The purpose of a portfolio is, in part, to 
capture demand from multiple consumer segments as it permits a retailer to price 
discriminate (Ailawadi and Keller, 2004). Generally, consumers are heterogeneous in 
their willingness to pay for added quality (Moorthy 1984). Therefore, carrying a multi-
tiered portfolio of brands with different price-quality strata from which consumers choose 
their desired products may generate greater profit than a single-tier strategy. Moreover, 
retailers benefit from private label portfolios in a number of other ways. 
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Private label portfolios allow retailers to achieve economies of scale and scope, 
which lowers their overall cost of production (Quelch and Kenny 1994; Alden, 
Steenkamp, and Batra 2003). The combined costs of producing multiple brands is often 
less than the cost of producing each brand separately (e.g., Grant and Jammine 1988). In 
addition, from a portfolio-theory perspective, private label portfolios permit retailers to 
diversify risks of brand failure, as carrying a number of brands assures them of revenue in 
case of one of their brands fails (Martos-Partal and Gonzalez-Benito 2011). Last, private 
label portfolios allow retailers to streamline their marketing efforts as they can market 
their brands simultaneously which enhances their effectiveness and efficiency (Palmeira 
and Thomas 2011).  
Carrying a portfolio of differentiated private labels may also present challenges to 
retailers. For example, it is costly to manage product variety. Large portfolios increase 
the complexity of managing inventory as well. In particular, demand forecasting becomes 
increasingly difficult, so inventory decisions involve greater uncertainty, and more 
attention to inter-brand relationships is necessary (Alfaro and Corbett 2003; Fisher and 
Ittner 1999; Wan, Evers and Dresner 2011). Further, manufacturing and distribution costs 
increase and, as a result, multiple tiers of private labels can compromise operational 
performance, and ultimately undermine sales (Alfaro and Corbett 2003; Ton and Raman 
2010). Importantly, private label portfolios lead to intraportfolio competition among the 
brands, which can result in cannibalization. Importantly, retailers pay more attention to 
cannibalization among private labels over national brands mainly because it may result in 
lower profits particular if the low-tier private labels cannibalize low-tier private labels. 
 57 
 
On the other hand retailers may not be concerned about cannibalization among national 
brands within their store as it does not affect their profitability.  
As evidence of the complexity of managing a multi-tier private-label portfolio, 
witness the strategies used by major US grocery retailers. Seeking to enhance its 
profitability, Walmart in 2013 reduced its private label portfolio to one from two brands, 
by dropping its low tier private label “Price First” and retaining its standard private label 
“Great Value” in various grocery categories (Springer  2013). However, during the same 
period, Kroger grew its private label portfolio to three tiers4. Similarly, Safeway and 
Target increased the number of private labels in their portfolios to two and three tiers 
respectively (Planet Retail 2012)5. Clearly, there is no commonly-agreed private label 
portfolio strategy among retailers in practice. 
Within-portfolio cannibalization can be reduced through the adoption of price-
quality tiers (Hilleke and Butscher 1997). Within these tiers, prices are important as they 
support market segmentation in that premium quality brands usually cost more than 
standard and economy brands. Therefore, a narrow price-gap between the tiers may result 
in highly similar indistinguishable price-quality tiers and brands. 
Brand Similarity  
Brand similarity is the perception held by consumers that the differences in the number of 
shared salient attributes between brands alternatives are minimal (Aaker and Keller 1990; 
Howard, Kerin and Gengler 2000). Brand similarity may impact brand preferences within 
                                                          
4 Kroger, offers “Private Selection” a premium brand, “Kroger Banner” a standard quality brand and 
“Kroger Value” a value brand, across multiple grocery categories. 
5 Safeway, offers “Safeway Select” a standard quality brand and “Pantry Essential” a value brand, across 
multiple grocery categories. Target, offers “Archer farms” a premium quality brand and “Market Pantry” a 
value brand, across multiple grocery categories. 
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a retailer’s private label portfolio as differentiation is key to attracting, and retaining, 
consumers with heterogeneous preferences for product attributes.  
The foundations of brand similarity lie in Tversky’s (1977) contrast model which 
describes similarity as a function of the number of salient shared attributes less the 
number of salient distinctive attributes between two or more brands.  For example, the 
similarity 𝑆(𝑎1 𝑎2) between two brands 𝑎1 and 𝑎2 is a function of their common 
attributes (𝐴1 ∩ 𝐴2) less the distinct attributes of 𝑎1, (𝑎1 − 𝑎2) and the distinct attributes 
of. 𝑎2, (𝑎2 − 𝑎1). Formally, 𝑆(𝑎1  𝑎2) = 𝜙𝑓(𝐴1 ∩ 𝐴2  ) − 𝛼𝑓(𝐴1 − 𝐴2  ) − 𝜃𝑓(𝐴2 −
𝐴1 ) where 𝜙, 𝛼 and. 𝜃 ≥ 0. The parameters 𝜙, 𝛼 and 𝜃 represent the weights of the 
attributes in the similarity judgment and the 𝑓 function represents the salience of the 
attributes and their contribution to similarity (Boush 1997). In this model, similarity is a 
linear combination of attributes that two brands share and attributes that are distinct. As 
such, brands that have shared attributes are considered similar, whereas brands that have 
attributes that are very different are perceived as relatively dissimilar (Keller and Sood 
2003).  
Brand similarity judgments within in a multi-tiered portfolio are also based on the 
price-gap between the brands. Prices are important as they support market segmentation 
within a brand portfolio. Specifically, prices define tiers in a way that is clear and 
understandable to consumers, with each tier strictly targeting its assigned price-quality 
segment. However, when the price-gap between the tiers is relatively small, it may result 
in consumers not being able to distinguish between the brands in the different quality 
tiers. Moreover, consumers often use price as an informational input to formulate product 
quality perceptions (Zeithaml, 1988; Lemon and Nowlis 2002; Völckner and Hofmann 
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2007). Hence, a small price differential may lead them to perceive that there is little 
difference in quality among the brands. Consequently, a narrow a price-gap between 
upper-tier and low-tier brands within a retailers’ private label portfolio results in higher 
brand similarity. Ultimately, high brand similarity may negate the effectiveness of multi-
tiered private label portfolios in that it limits variety within the portfolio as there is 
minimal differentiation between the brands, which may, in turn, lead to lower market 
shares. 
Using the framework described in the next section, I test whether the price-gap 
between private labels in different quality tiers results in increased brand similarity and if 
this impacts brands private label market shares. I also investigate whether high brand 
similarity results in cannibalization between upper-tier and low-tier private labels within 
a retailer’s portfolio. 
Model Specification 
Measuring the extent of cannibalization is a complex topic, with no definitive approach 
generally accepted in the empirical literature. Analytical models tend to find that cross-
price elasticities derived from demand-system models are a more definitive measure of 
cannibalization effects than market share measures (Lomax et al 1996; Yuan et al 2009). 
Essentially, large (more positive) cross-price elasticities suggest the presence of 
cannibalization as this means that a price increase for one brand has a relatively large 
effect on volume sales of a substitute brand. However, the type of demand system 
potentially can have an important effect on estimated elasticities.  
In this study, I model consumers’ brand-level demand as a function of inherent 
consumer preferences for each brand, prices, and product characteristics using a nested 
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logit model (Berry 1994; Cardell 1997). I use a nested logit, because preferences are 
assumed to be hierarchical in nature: Consumers choose a quality-tier first, and brand 
variants within the tier second. Importantly, the nested logit demand model combines 
multiple brands, multiple tiers, and differing levels of similarity in a relatively 
parsimonious way. Specifically, higher similarity between brands within a quality-tier 
lead to a higher own-price effect, and higher within-tier cross price effects (Hui 2004; 
Aribarg and Arora 2008). In addition, dividing brand variants by quality-tier represents a 
natural choice because consumers are more likely to substitute among brand variants 
within quality tiers than across tiers. Consumers are prone to substitute between variants 
to satisfy their need for variety instead of trying different brands within a product 
category (Feng and Bassok 2008).  
 I extend the traditional nested demand model to allow for perceived brand 
similarity in a distance metric (DM) framework (Pinkse, Slade, and Brett 2002; Slade 
2004). DM demand models frame consumer preferences in explicitly spatial terms. That 
is, each product in the consideration set is located a certain distance in attribute space 
from each other product. DM models represent a natural way to test the importance of 
differentiation, because distance is explicit, and not implicit as in traditional logit-based 
models of demand (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 2005). My measure of brand similarity 
represents a second-order effect that not only accounts for brand attributes but also the 
price differential between the tiers. I begin my analysis by modeling consumer demand in 
the next section. I also consider counterfactuals that examine the effects of high and low 
brand similarity on private label market shares.  
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Consumer Demand  
I assume consumers employ a hierarchical decision process. Specifically, they make a 
discrete choice of a quality-tier 𝑟 (𝑟 = 1, . . . , 𝑅. )  from among those represented by my 
sample of retail data, or else an alternative quality-tier which I define to be the outside 
option. Second, they decide on which of the 𝐽 brand-variants to purchase. Therefore, the 
utility consumer 𝑖 derives from consuming brand-variant 𝑗 in quality-tier 𝑟 during 
period 𝑡 is given by: 
𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿𝑟𝑗𝑡 + 𝜁𝑖𝑟𝑡 + (1 − 𝜎)𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑟𝑡                                                                          (1) 
where:  
𝛿𝑟𝑗𝑡 = 𝜂𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑗𝑘𝑡 + 𝛼1𝑝𝑟𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑑𝑟𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑑𝑟𝑗𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑗𝑡 + 𝜉𝑟𝑗𝑡                         (2) 
From equation (1) 𝜁𝑖𝑣 represents the common taste for brand-variants from tier 𝑟 and has 
a distribution that depends on 𝜎, 0 ≤ 𝜎 ≤ 1 such that 𝜁𝑖𝑟𝑡 + (1 − 𝜎)𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑟𝑡  has an extreme 
value distribution if the household specific error term 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑟𝑡 is itself extreme-value 
distributed (Cardell 1997). The parameter σ measures the degree of heterogeneity among 
the groups, in this case the quality tiers. When σ = 1, the correlation among tiers goes to 
1 and the tiers are regarded as perfect substitutes. On the other hand as σ goes towards 0, 
the correlation among the tiers trends towards zero such that when σ = 0, the model 
reduces to the ordinary logit model where all the variants belong to the same group and 
the elasticities of substitution are perfectly symmetric. Therefore, the magnitude of σ 
indicates the extent to which consumers view brand variants in a given quality tier to be 
similar. The mean utility of the no purchase option is normalized to 0 and the 
corresponding utility is 𝑈𝑖00𝑡  =  𝜁𝑖00𝑡. 
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Equation (2) is the level of mean utility for each choice of variant j and tier 𝑟. The 
parameter 𝜂𝑟𝑡 captures consumer preference for tier 𝑟 in time period 𝑡, 𝑥𝑗𝑘𝑡  represents 
observable product characteristics 𝑘 making up variant 𝑗 at time period 𝑡, 𝑝𝑟𝑗𝑡 is the price 
of brand-variant 𝑗 at time period 𝑡, 𝑓𝑟𝑗𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
variant 𝑗 is on promotion at time period 𝑡, 𝑓𝑟𝑗𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑗𝑡 is an interaction between the price and 
the promotion indicator 𝜉𝑟𝑗𝑡, represents the temporal utility shock that is observed by the 
consumer but not the researcher and is common to all consumers in the market. 
I extend the usual nested logit model by accounting explicitly for brand similarity 
using the distance metric approach. To implement the DM approach, I define a distance 
matrix 𝑊 in which each element represents the inverse distance (proximity) between the 
brand variants in attribute space and price (Anselin 1988). More specifically, the distance 
matrix, 𝑊 has typical element  𝑤𝑟𝑗 between brand variants 𝑗 in tier 𝑟 such that: 
𝑤𝑟𝑗𝑙 = [(𝑝𝑎 − 𝑝𝑏)
2 + 1 + 𝐼𝑗(𝑎, 𝑏)] [1 + 2√∑(𝑛𝑎,𝑘 − 𝑛𝑏,𝑘)
2
𝑗
 ]
−1
 (3) 
where 𝑃𝑎 and 𝑃𝑏 denote the prices of brands 𝑎 and 𝑏 respectively, 𝐼𝑗(𝑎, 𝑏) is an indicator 
function which takes the value of 1 when both brands are in different tier and 0 if 
otherwise, 𝑛 represents the attribute profile of two items 𝑖 and 𝑗. For example, in the 
breakfast cereal category, 𝑛 consists of cereal attributes such sugar content, calories per 
serving and carbohydrates content. Equation (3) therefore, measures of how close (i.e. 
how similar) the brand variants are. I then define a 𝐽 ×  𝐽 spatial weight matrix 𝑾 that 
includes all of the 𝑤𝑟𝑗𝑙 as elements. The spatial weight matrix measures the similarity 
between each pair of brand variants in my sample. Importantly, I row-standardize the 
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spatial weight matrix such that row-sum to unity i.e.∑ = 1𝑟𝑗 , I set the main diagonal to 
normalized to 0, since it measures the distance of each product to itself. Thus, equation 
(3) measures how each consumer forms a perception of the extent to which a brand is 
distinct from others based on its distance in attribute space and price.  
I use the 𝑾 matrix to capture the effect of brand similarity on utility into equation 
(2) such that the mean utility consumer 𝑖 derives from consuming brand-variant 𝑗 in 
quality-tier 𝑟 during period 𝑡 is now given by: 
𝛿𝑟𝑗𝑡 = 𝜂𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝒙 𝑗𝑘𝑡 + 𝛼1𝒑𝑟𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼2𝒅𝑟𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼3𝒅𝑟𝑗𝑡𝒑𝑟𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑾𝑟𝑗𝑡𝑷𝑳𝑟𝑡 + 𝜉𝑟𝑗𝑡         (4) 
where 𝑷𝑳 is a 𝐽 × 1  vector of private label indicators which takes the value of 1 when 
the brand variant is a private label and 0 if otherwise. Spatial models provide an element 
of intuition that is missing from non-spatial models, based on the explicit treatment of 
spatial differentiation (Slade 2004). In equation (4), 𝑾𝑟𝑗𝑡 is central to my hypotheses in 
that 𝛾 is the main parameter of interest. The sign of 𝛾 is interpreted as measuring how 
brand similarity affects market shares. In the terminology of spatial econometrics, 𝛾 is the 
spatial auto-regressive (SAR) parameter (Anselin 2002), as it measures how distances 
between brands affect preferences.  Because the elements of 𝑾 are defined as inverse 
distance, for easier interpretation, larger values of 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑙 indicate that two brands are closer 
together. Therefore, if 𝛾 is positive, then carrying similar brands results in increased 
market share, and if 𝛾 is negative it implies that carrying similar brands reduces market 
share. In terms of the Principle of Maximum Differentiation, a negative 𝛾  suggests that 
highly differentiated portfolio is optimal as brands that are highly differentiated result in 
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increased market shares and those that are similar have a negative impact on market 
shares.   
However, the model still exhibits the (IIA) property within each group (tier). This 
implies an impractical pattern of substitution. Thus, to avoid this problem I allow the 
marginal utility of income 𝛼𝑖, the product-specific preference term 𝛿𝑟𝑗𝑡 and the brand 
similarity measure 𝑾𝑟𝑗𝑡  to vary randomly (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 1995; Nevo 
2001; McFadden and Train 2000). Formally, the marginal utility of income is normally 
distributed over consumers such that: 
𝛼𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝜎𝛼𝑣𝑖 ,        𝑣𝑖~𝑁(0,1)                                                                   (5)  
where 𝑣𝑖  is the consumer-specific variation 𝛼 in response with parameter 𝛼0. In similar 
vein, product-specific preferences also depend on individual attributes, I specify it as: 
𝛿𝑖𝑟𝑗 = 𝛿0𝑟𝑗 + 𝜎𝛿𝜇𝑖       𝜇𝑖~𝑁(0,1)                                                               (6) 
where 𝛿0𝑖𝑗 is the mean preference for brand 𝑗 in quality-tier 𝑟 and 𝜇𝑖 is the random 
consumer specific effect on variant and quality-tier preferences. Last, I allow the 
marginal utility parameters (spatial autoregressive parameter) for the brand similarity 
effect to be random such that: 
𝛾𝑟𝑗𝑡 = 𝛾10 + 𝜎1𝛾𝑧𝑖,    𝑧𝑖~𝑁(0,1)                                                                (7) 
where 𝛾10 represents mean preference for brand similarity, and 𝑧𝑖is the random 
component for consumer 𝑖 . 
I follow Nevo (2001), and Richards and Hamilton (2015) and write the indirect 
utility function in the general case in terms of two sets of variables (random and non-
random) as follows: 
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𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿𝑟𝑗𝑡(𝑝𝑟𝑗𝑡, 𝑥𝑗𝑡𝑧𝑙 , 𝜁𝑗𝑟𝑡: 𝛾, 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜎) + 𝜑𝑖𝑗𝑡(𝑝𝑟𝑗𝑡, 𝑥𝑗𝑡 , 𝑣ℎ , 𝜇ℎ, 𝑧ℎ, 𝜎𝛼, 𝜎𝛾, 𝜎𝑧)
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑟𝑡                                                                                        (8) 
where 𝛿𝑟𝑗𝑡represents the mean level of utility that varies over brand-variants, but not 
consumers, 𝜑𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the idiosyncratic part that varies by consumer and product. Define the 
densities of 𝜇𝑖  𝑣𝑖 and 𝑧𝑖 as 𝑓(𝜇), 𝑔(𝑣)and(𝑧), respectively, so that the market share of 
variants 𝑗, obtained by integrating over the distributions reflecting consumer 
heterogeneity, becomes: 
𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ∫∫
exp (𝛿𝑟𝑗𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖𝑗𝑡) (1 − 𝜎)⁄
𝐷𝐼
𝜎(∑ 𝐷𝐼
1−𝜎)𝐽
𝑓(𝜇)𝑔(𝑣)ℎ(𝑧)𝑑𝜇𝑑𝑣𝑑𝑧,           (9) 
 
where 𝐷𝐼 = ∑ exp
(𝛿𝑟𝑗𝑡+𝜑𝑖𝑗𝑡) (1−𝜎)⁄  𝑖∈𝐼 .Taking into account that there is no closed form-
expression for market share as in the simple logit case (Berry 1994). I estimate equation 
(8) with simulated maximum likelihood (SML) (Train 2003) using the control function 
approach (Petrin and Train 2010).  
Counterfactual Simulations  
To further determine the effects of brand similarity on private label market shares, I 
conduct counterfactual simulations to calculate changes in private label market shares 
and elasticities under a variety of alternative assumptions.  
The simulations are intended to determine whether higher levels of brand 
similarity result in lower private label market shares. More specifically, I vary the spatial-
auto regressive parameter introduced in the demand model, and calculate the resulting 
impact on private label market shares and elasticities. The first scenario assumes a market 
where there is low brand similarity. Here, I restrict 𝛾 to a range between -5 and -1. I also 
conduct a simulation in which I assume high brand similarity by restricting 𝛾 to a range 
 66 
 
between 1 and 5. I describe the data used to test this model, and my estimation 
procedures, in the next section.  
Data 
Unlike in developed economies, breakfast cereal sales in South Africa have continued to 
grow steadily in recent years. In 2014, annual sales rose to $3.2 billion, up 15% from 
2010 (Euromonitor 2014). This continuous growth has been spurred, in part, by the 
growth of middle income consumers, who are looking for non-traditional South African 
breakfast options.  
The retail breakfast cereal market in South Africa is highly concentrated. The 
four-firm concentration ratio is approximately 89% and the market is controlled by five 
major players, Pick n Pay, Woolworths, Shoprite, Spar, and Walmart’s subsidiary, 
Cambridge Foods. Although the market is dominated by national brands6, each of the 
retailers except Cambridge Foods sells a private label. In fact, Pick n Pay, and Spar each 
carry a multi-tiered portfolio of private labels to target different market segments. Pick n 
Pay offers “Pnp” a standard quality brand and “No name” an economy brand. Likewise, 
Spar, carries, “Spar” a standard quality brand and “SaveMor” an economy brand.  I focus 
the analysis on these brands.  
My data consists of a household-panel scanner data set (Homescan), collected by 
Nielsen. The data tracks South African households between August 2013 and June 2014, 
and is broadly representative of household consumption in South Africa.  Households in 
the panel keep shopping diaries in which they record their biweekly purchases of all 
                                                          
6 Kellogg’s is the most popular brand, commanding a market share of 21.8%. Bokomo and Weet-Bix are 
second and third, respectively, with market shares of 19.4% and 17.8% and private label market shares 
average 3.1% 
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grocery items. Essentially, the data describes the main characteristics of their purchases, 
which include quantity, price and date of purchase.  
To test my hypotheses, I use purchases from 15 brand-variants7. These brands 
account for about 78.7% of the sales in the sample. I draw my variants from both national 
brands and private labels. Importantly, each variant belongs to a quality tier 𝑟 (𝑟 =
1, . . . , 𝑅. ). To determine which tier each brand belongs to I refer to its classification on 
the retailers or manufacturer website (for national brands). I also verify the tier of each 
brand by consulting an industry expert8. For the private labels, I use purchases of brand 
variants from Pick n Pay brands, (PnP and Noname) and Spar brands (Spar brand and 
SaveMor). Purchases of these four brands account for about 55.8% of the private label 
sales and 4.8% of total sales for the five retailers in the sample. On average, the Pick n 
Pay brands, PnP (market share 1.2%), and No name (market share, 0.8%) outperform 
their same tier competitors offered by Spar, Spar (market share, 0.9%), and Savemor 
(market share, 0.6%) respectively (see table 8).   
Average prices across the brands appear to highlight the tier-compression 
dynamic described in the introduction as the price-gap is very narrow. For example, for 
the upper-tier brands, PnP and Spar, the mean prices are R26.93 and R21.22 respectively. 
Whereas, for the low-tier brands, Noname and Savmor the mean prices are R22.89 and 
R19.789. Moreover, the prices frequently overlap during the observed time period with 
                                                          
7 A brand variant is a different offering of a brand for example, Bokomo is the brand and Bokomo bran 
flakes and Bokomo Corn flakes are brand-variants. 
8 Consultation was via email with Craig KoIb from Acentric Marketing Research in Johannesburg South 
Africa. 
9 In comparison the price-gap in the US between upper tier and low-tier private labels is large. For example 
the price-gap between, Kroger’s cereal brands “Kroger Brand” (R47.29) and “P$$T…, Check This Out” 
(R30.42) is relatively large. 
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several periods where the upper-tier private label cost less than the lower tier private 
labels (see figure 2). 
Table 8, Brand Market Shares and Mean Prices (%) 
 
Brand  
 
 
Market Share (%) 
 
Av. Price (ZAR) 
 
Bokomo 19.45 26.47 
Kellogg’s  21.87 29.75 
Noname  0.78 22.89 
PnP 1.26 26.93 
Spar 0.93 21.22 
Savmor   0.65 19.78 
Weetbix 17.88 24.48 
Jungle  15.62 20.25 
 
I aggregate all purchases in each two week period, and calculate the market share 
for each brand. Market share is defined as the sum of the purchases of each brand during 
a two week period divided by the total market size of the respective period. Market size, 
in turn, is calculated by assuming each household consumes 125g of breakfast cereal 
weekly, which implies a biweekly average of 250g (Analytixbi 2014).  I calculate the 
total size of the market by multiplying the biweekly average consumption with the total 
population of the market. I define the share of the outside good as the difference between 
the total size of the market and the shares of the inside goods (Berry, Levinsohn, and 
Pakes 1995). Therefore, the outside good includes breakfast cereal alternatives as well as 
breakfast cereal sold by retailers not included in the analysis.  
In retail data, prices are assumed to be endogenous. That is, prices are likely to be 
correlated with unobservables, such as shelf-space positioning, or in-store promotions, 
that also affect market shares. Therefore, an instrumental-variables (IV) estimating 
method is necessary. To that end, I obtained data on input prices to serve as instruments 
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(Villas-Boas 2007; and many others). I use electricity prices to measure energy-input 
costs, which I obtain from Electricity Supply Commission of South Africa (Eskom 
Tariffs and Charges 2014). I also use corn and wheat prices as inputs. Corn is one of the 
most used ingredient in producing breakfast cereal (Euromonitor 2010). However, a 
number of the brands in my analysis also have wheat as a major ingredient. I obtain the 
data on wheat prices and corn prices from the South African Grain Information Service 
(SAGIS). Marginal cost also includes fuel prices from South Africa (Stats SA) as petrol 
is a key components of distribution costs. Manufacturing wage data are from the South 
African Department of Labor. Importantly, the input prices vary over time, and the input 
contents also vary by brand, so the interaction between input prices and brands provides 
enough variation to identify the demand parameters. Further, because the demand model 
includes variant fixed effects, my instruments will not be correlated with the observed 
error terms for each demand equation.  
Table 9, Summary Statistics for the Input Variables. 
 
Variable  
 
 
Units  
 
Mean 
 
SD 
 
Min 
 
Max 
Petrol R/Liter 13.554 0.485 12.843 14.163 
Diesel R/Liter 12.895 0.331 12.484 13.432 
Wheat R/Ton 3701.254 240.069 3301.147 41903.014 
Flour R/Kg 9.324 0.715 8.6233 10.622 
Electricity R/Kwh 0.505 0.049 0.4132 0.592 
Labor R/Month 2960.971 74.205 2359.410 3480.821 
Corn  R/Ton 2285.921 71.631 1790.041 2976.942 
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Estimation  
There are a number of issues to address when estimating the demand model (9). First, as 
briefly discussed above, some potentially-important product characteristics (e.g. 
advertising and shelf placement) may have been omitted in the specification of utility, but 
are likely correlated with the price paid by consumers. The resulting endogeneity leads to 
bias if not addressed (Villas-Boas and Winer 1999).  Although there are many possible 
estimation methods within the class of IV estimators, I account for endogeneity by 
estimating the demand model using the control function approach (Petrin and Train 
2010). The control function approach addresses price endogeneity through a two-stage 
estimation method. In the first stage, I estimate an IV regression in which I regress the 
endogenous prices on a set of instruments. In the second stage, the demand model is 
estimated using simulated maximum likelihood (SML, Train 2003) with the residuals 
from the first stage as independent variables. Including the first-stage residuals as the 
control function essentially purges the residuals of any correlation with the endogenous 
prices.  
Following Draganska and Jain (2005) and Bonnet and Dubois (2010) I use the 
input prices described above as instruments. Specifically, I use prices of wheat, fuel, 
corn, labor and electricity. These inputs are appropriate instruments because they are 
likely to be correlated with retail prices, but likely uncorrelated with unobservables in the 
demand equation. Further, I interact the input prices with product dummies, which allows 
each input to enter the production function of each product differently (Villas Boas 
2006). This is a reasonable assumption as breakfast cereals use inputs in different 
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proportion, depending upon the type of cereal, the type of production process used, and 
the amount of transportation involved in moving it to market.  
I then test the validity of the instruments using a variety of different approaches.  
First, I test for the relevance of the instrumental variables by regressing retail prices on 
the set of instruments (Staiger and Stock 1997) in a first-stage regression. I reject the 
hypothesis that the instrumental variables are not relevant as the first-stage F-statistic is 
relatively high:  38.05, which is easily above the threshold of 10.0 defined by Staiger and 
Stock (1997).  I also examine the partial 𝑅2 statistic in the first stage regression. The 
partial 𝑅2 is the squared partial correlation between the excluded instruments and the 
endogenous regressor (Baum, Stillman, and Schaffer 2003). I use the Shea Partial  𝑅2  
statistic to test for instrument relevance. An 𝑅2 of 0.49 also suggests that the instruments 
are relevant. Third, I also use the Cragg-Donald F-statistic (Stock and Yogo 2002) to test 
for weak instruments. By this criterion, an F-statistic of  (20.786, 𝑝 < 0.05)  indicates 
that the instruments are valid.  Finally, I also test the exogeneity of the instrumental 
variables following Hansen (1982). The J-statistic of 755.215 (𝑝 < 0.285) implies that 
the IV’s are indeed exogenous. Therefore, based on the results from these tests, I 
conclude that the estimates are likely to be valid, so I proceed in the next section to 
interpret the results from this model.  
Results and Discussion  
In this section, I present the results obtained from estimating the random parameter 
nested logit in equation (9) above. I first present the results from specification tests to 
establish the validity of the maintained model, and then interpret the coefficient estimates 
from the preferred specification. Last, I present findings derived from the counterfactual 
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simulations, and how these inform the hypothesis regarding the relationship between 
brand similarity and private label market shares.  
Tables 10 represents results for two different models:  Model 1 is a simple nested 
logit demand model (limited model), and Model 2 is a more comprehensive nested logit 
demand model that takes into account similarity between upper tier and lower tier private 
labels. I begin my analysis by comparing the two models. Given that the limited model is 
nested in comprehensive model I conduct a likelihood ratio (LR) test to compare the 
models. Based on the LR test statistic, the estimated Chi-square value is (23.44 𝑝 <
0.05). This result shows that adding the brand similarity measure as an independent 
variable results in a statistically significant improvement in model fit. Furthermore, the 
limited model understates the promotion effect and the degree of substitutability among 
the tiers – both results are important from a managerial perspective. Therefore, I reject 
the limited model in favor of the comprehensive model.  
As a first step in interpreting the demand model results, I evaluate whether the 
form of the nested logit model used here (i.e. tier choice, then brand-variant) is an 
appropriate representation of breakfast cereal demand.  My results reveal that the 
estimated nested logit scale parameter is 𝜎1 = 0.723, 𝑝 < 0.001, which is significantly 
different from zero, and indicates that consumer utility is highly correlated within tiers. 
This estimate also suggests that utility is nearly uncorrected across the tiers, implying that 
the nested logit model is appropriate for the task at hand.   
Next, I assess whether the random parameter specification is preferred to a 
constant parameter alternative specification by examining whether the standard deviation 
of the price and intercept terms used to describe unobserved heterogeneity are statistically 
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significant. The standard deviations of price (𝑡 = 4.771) and income (𝑡 = 3.851) are 
greater than the relevant critical value (𝑡 = 1.96), so I reject the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient standard-deviations are equal to zero.  Moreover, the significance of these 
parameters in the random parameter model supports this specification over a constant 
parameter alternative.  Further, I perform a likelihood ratio (LR) test in which the 
constant parameter model is the restricted version and is compared to the random 
parameter model which is the unrestricted version. The LR statistic for the test is 33.46 
while the critical Chi-square value with 5 degrees of freedom at the 5% level of 
significance is 11.074. Therefore, I reject the fixed parameter model in favor of the 
random-parameter alternative.  I conclude that the random parameter model is preferred 
to the constant parameter version, so I use this version to interpret the demand results. 
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Table 10a. Random Coefficient Nested Logit Demand: Breakfast Cereals – 
Limited Model 
 Non-Random Parameters Random  Parameters 
 Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio 
Price -2.035* -4.377 - - 
 
0.714* 9.606 0.715* 9.152 
Discount  0.671* 3.739 0.672* 3.778 
Discount × Price -1.066* -4.002 -1.068* -4.12 
Brand Similarity - - - - 
Variant 1 0.612* 2.026 0.611* 1.381 
Variant 2 -0.283 -0.933 -0.279 -0.539 
Variant 4 0.520* 1.758 0.524* 1.925 
Variant 5 0.243* 0.819 0.245 0.574 
Variant 6 0.392 1.335 0.393 0.574 
Variant 7 -0.769* -2.789 -0.767* -2.936 
Variant 8 -1.263* -4.163 -1.261* -4.381 
Variant 9 -0.591* -2.08 -0.590* -2.159 
Variant 10 0.119 0.397 0.12 0.422 
Variant 11 1.541 5.667 1.544* 6.125 
Variant 12 0.619 1.769 0.623* 1.859 
Variant 13 -0.071 -0.251 -0.068 -0.253 
Variant 14 -0.583* -2.218 -0.582* -2.345 
Variant 15 -0.713* -2.205 -0.713* -2.42 
Constant -15.363* -17.309 - - 
CF 0.184 0.378 0.192 0.414 
Means for Random Parameters -  - - 
Constant - - -15.370* -19.322 
Price -  -2.040* -4.496 
Brand Similarity - - - - 
Std Dev for Random Parameters 
 
Constant   0.130* 6.69 
Price   0.006* 0.192 
Brand Similarity   - - 
LLF   -2627.823 
Chi Square  25.48 
* 𝑝 < 0.05   
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Table 10b. Random Coefficient Nested Logit Demand: Breakfast Cereals – Brand 
Similarity Model 
 
Non-Random 
Parameters 
Random  Parameters 
  Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio 
Price -2.165* -4.663   
 
0.721* 9.726 0.723* 9.427 
Discount 0.681* 3.525 0.686* 3.53 
Discount × Price -1.013* -3.813 -1.006* -3.887 
Brand Similarity -0.467* -3.917 - - 
Variant 1 0.569 1.888 0.571* 1.264 
Variant 2 -0.265 -0.876 -0.259 -0.533 
Variant 4 0.506 1.717 0.510* 1.881 
Variant 5 0.226 0.766 0.228 0.554 
Variant 6 0.394 1.346 0.396 0.608 
Variant 7 -0.792* -2.883 -0.788* -3.048 
Variant 8 -1.270* -4.204 -1.269* -4.451 
Variant 9 -0.625* -2.206 -0.624* -2.299 
Variant 10 0.138 0.462 0.141 0.495 
Variant 11 1.496* 5.516 1.499* 5.978 
Variant 12 0.622* 1.784 0.630* 1.877 
Variant 13 -0.113 -0.404 -0.111 -0.419 
Variant 14 -0.584* -2.231 -0.588* -2.366 
Variant 15 -0.739* -2.291 -0.734* -2.474 
Constant -14.760* -16.445 - - 
CF 0.245 0.503 0.247 0.533 
Means for Random Parameters 
Constant - - -14.749* -18.8 
Price - - -2.170* -4.771 
Brand Similarity - - -0.472* -3.851 
Std Dev for Random Parameters 
Constant   0.165* 7.898 
Price   0.044* 1.396 
Brand Similarity   0.163* 1.806 
LLF     -2616.124 
Chi Square     33.467 
* 𝑝 < 0.05    
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The demand estimates shown in table 10 reveal that promotions have a significant 
effect on demand. Moreover, discounting breakfast cereal results in an outward shift and 
negative (counterclockwise) rotation of demand suggesting that demand becomes more 
elastic when a breakfast cereal is on promotion. This result indicates that customers may 
anticipate retailers’ promotional activities and adjust their purchasing behavior 
accordingly. In all, this suggests that breakfast cereals in the South African market are 
slightly responsive to price promotions. I also find that national brand variants are 
preferred to private label variants As a matter of fact, among all the variants, variants 
from Kellogg’s (variant 11 and variant 12) have the highest mean utility. In addition, I 
also find that there is a high correlation between mean utility and market share in the 
sample. For example, based on the data in table 9 variants from Kellogg’s are some of the 
most expensive brands but they also have the highest market share.  
The focus of this essay, however, is on the nature of the tier structure among 
brands, and how similarity affects market shares across tiers. The demand results in table 
10 show that on average, private label variants from PnP and Noname (variants 3, 6 and 
7) have a lower mean utility than brand variants from Spar and Savmor (variants 2 and 
5).  Moreover, I also find that the preferences for variants from Spar and Savemor clearly 
violate the brand-tier structure (upper-tier and low-tier). That is, the mean utility of the 
upper tier brand variant (variant 2) is lower than that of the low-tier private label (variants 
5). This is also the case for the variants from PnP and Noname, as the consumers show 
greater preference for the low-tier Noname variants (variants 3 and 6) suggesting that 
brand similarity between the upper-tier and low-tier brands negates the effectiveness of 
the brand portfolio.  
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Importantly, the estimate for brand similarity (the spatial auto-regressive 
parameter on brand similarity) shown in table 10 is significantly different from zero. I 
interpret this parameter as indicating the effect of brand similarity on market share. For 
example, conditional on prices and other product characteristics, a positive brand 
similarity coefficient means that if a retailer carries brands that are similar it results in 
increased market share, and a negative coefficient means that it results reduced market 
shares. From the comprehensive model, I find that the coefffieent on brand similarity is 
negative and significant, suggesting that that carrying similar private-label brands has a 
negative effect on the market share of brands that are more similar to others. Put 
differently, the less differentiation there is between the private-label brands, the lower the 
market share.  This result is consistent with my hypothesis as it highlights that having a 
highly undifferentiated brand portfolio results in decreased market share. Moreover, this 
suggests that the Principle of Maximum Differentiation outcome better describes private 
label portfolio strategies as undifferentiated brands tend to have lower market shares.  
Beyond the direct effect of similarity, however, perhaps the stronger impact on 
private labels market shares is through cannibalization, or large cross-price elasticities 
that suggest promotions, or any other form of price variation, are likely to draw more 
from a private labels product than would otherwise be the case. Table 11 provides the 
entire matrix of own-and cross price elasticities. All estimates have expected signs, and 
are statistically different from zero. The average own-price effect is negative (as 
expected), the estimate of −4.761 suggests that breakfast cereal in the South African 
market is elastic which is reasonable, taking into account that breakfast cereals are highly 
differentiated products. The own price elasticities range of from −6.482 to −2.247, 
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suggesting that some variants are vulnerable to other variants. However, private labels 
seem to be more price sensitive: The average price elasticity of −4.582 is much larger 
than the average own-price elasticity for national brands of −3.521. In fact, lower tier 
private labels are more price sensitive than upper-tier private labels. In addition, I also 
find that the own-price elasticity is higher in the comprehensive model that includes the 
brand similarity measures as opposed to the limited model that does not include the 
similarity measures10.  
More importantly, the cross price elasticities from the comprehensive model also 
highlight that there is considerable entrenched preference among the national brands as 
the cross price elasticities among them is relatively low. However, the cross price 
elasticities among private labels is relatively high suggesting that private labels are strong 
substitutes for each other. This result provides evidence of cannibalization across retailers 
as there is high substitutability among private labels from the different retailers. This may 
explain why private label market shares are low for each retailer, as consumers are 
willing to substitute among private labels but not among national brands.  
Moreover, the cross price elasticity is relatively high between upper-tier and low-
tier brands within a retailer’s portfolio. For example, the average cross price elasticity 
between variants for Pick n Pay brands (PnP and Noname) is 0.473. This is also true for 
variants from Spar brands (Spar and Savmor) were the cross price elasticity is 0.354. This 
high cross price elasticity confirms the presence of cannibalization within the portfolio. 
These high cross-brand sales not only negate the effectiveness of private label portfolios, 
but they may also explain the relatively low private label market shares in emerging 
                                                          
10For  the entire matrix of own-and cross price elasticities for the limited model see Appendix A  
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economies. Strong intraportfolio competition results in private labels competing among 
themselves rather than of with national brands.  
I also compared the cross price elasticities between the comprehensive model and 
limited model. The cross price elasticities from the comprehensive model are relatively 
higher which highlights the importance of accounting for brand similarity when 
estimating cannibalization rates between brands. 
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Table 11. Own and Cross Price Elasticity Matrix 
 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 V13 V14 V15 
Variant 1 -3.594 0.035 0.037 0.328 0.036 0.359 0.068 0.219 0.099 0.071 0.036 0.036 0.085 0.069 0.064 
Variant 2 0.035 -2.509 0.496 0.050 0.250 0.250 0.476 0.153 0.069 0.050 0.026 0.025 0.060 0.148 0.045 
Variant 3 0.036 0.496 -2.247 0.022 0.322 0.242 0.426 0.137 0.062 0.044 0.023 0.023 0.053 0.043 0.040 
Variant 4 0.328 0.050 0.022 -4.007 0.400 0.040 0.076 0.244 0.110 0.079 0.041 0.040 0.095 0.077 0.072 
Variant 5 0.036 0.250 0.322 0.400 -2.970 0.030 0.056 0.181 0.082 0.059 0.303 0.030 0.071 0.057 0.053 
Variant 6 0.359 0.250 0.242 0.040 0.030 -2.834 0.454 0.173 0.078 0.056 0.029 0.284 0.167 0.054 0.051 
Variant 7 0.068 0.476 0.426 0.076 0.056 0.454 -4.646 0.286 0.129 0.093 0.048 0.047 0.047 0.290 0.084 
Variant 8 0.219 0.153 0.137 0.244 0.181 0.173 0.286 -4.814 0.139 0.100 0.052 0.051 0.121 0.097 0.091 
Variant 9 0.099 0.069 0.062 0.110 0.082 0.078 0.129 0.139 -4.802 0.096 0.050 0.049 0.116 0.094 0.088 
Variant 10 0.071 0.050 0.044 0.079 0.059 0.056 0.093 0.100 0.096 -5.487 0.057 0.056 0.132 0.106 0.099 
Variant 11 0.037 0.026 0.023 0.041 0.303 0.029 0.048 0.052 0.050 0.057 -4.368 0.044 0.044 0.104 0.084 
Variant 12 0.036 0.025 0.023 0.040 0.030 0.284 0.047 0.051 0.049 0.056 0.044 -6.482 0.154 0.124 0.116 
Variant 13 0.085 0.060 0.053 0.095 0.071 0.167 0.047 0.121 0.116 0.132 0.044 0.154 -4.923 0.096 0.090 
Variant 14 0.069 0.148 0.043 0.077 0.057 0.054 0.290 0.097 0.094 0.106 0.104 0.124 0.096 -2.344 0.042 
Variant 15 0.064 0.045 0.040 0.072 0.053 0.051 0.084 0.091 0.088 0.099 0.084 0.116 0.090 0.042 -5.293 
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Table 12 shows results of the counterfactual scenario in which I examine the 
effects of varying brand similarity on private label market shares. More specifically, I 
investigate the impact of either decreasing or increasing brand similarity on private label 
market shares. I find that reducing brand similarity has two major consequences. First, it 
results in increased market shares suggesting that lower brand similarity enhances brand 
differentiation within the private label portfolio. This is consistent with not only the 
Principle of Maximum Differentiation but also prior research which demonstrates that 
product differentiation positively impacts market shares (Anderson, Fornell and Lehmann 
1994; Makadok and Ross 2012). Second, I find that the effects of lowering brand 
similarity within the portfolio varies with brand-variant. For example, for some variants’ 
market shares go down as similarity decreases suggesting that variants benefit from being 
similar to other variants within the portfolio. Moreover, I also find that the own-price 
elasticity increases as brand similarity decreases. In terms of cross-price elasticities they 
go down as brand similarity increases. This points out that increasing the brand similarity 
also reduces cannibalization among the retailer’s brands. Last, I also find that higher 
brand similarity lowers market shares. Moreover, higher brand similarity results in 
increased cross-price elasticities among the brands, and hence cannibalization.   
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Table 12. Simulation Results: Relatively Increase in Brand Similarity 
 
 
 
% ∆ in Market Share 
 
 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4 5 
Variant 1 0.605 0.427 0.268 0.127 0.002 -0.208 -0.296 -0.374 -0.444 -0.506 
Variant 2 -0.541 -0.444 -0.327 -0.185 -0.012 0.449 0.756 1.127 1.576 2.121 
Variant 3 -0.812 -0.777 -0.736 -0.686 -0.628 -0.476 -0.378 -0.262 -0.125 0.039 
Variant 4 -0.694 -0.682 -0.670 -0.658 -0.645 -0.618 -0.603 -0.588 -0.573 -0.557 
Variant 5 1.692 1.248 0.878 0.569 0.310 -0.086 -0.236 -0.362 -0.467 -0.555 
Variant 6 0.428 0.319 0.218 0.126 0.040 -0.112 -0.180 -0.242 -0.300 -0.353 
Variant 7 0.272 0.535 0.852 1.235 1.696 2.925 3.736 4.715 5.896 7.320 
Variant 8 -0.738 -0.779 -0.813 -0.842 -0.867 -0.905 -0.920 -0.932 -0.943 -0.951 
Variant 9 0.022 -0.064 -0.144 -0.216 -0.283 -0.399 -0.450 -0.496 -0.539 -0.578 
Variant 10 -0.031 -0.014 0.003 0.020 0.037 0.073 0.092 0.111 0.130 0.149 
Variant 11 0.801 0.676 0.560 0.453 0.352 0.172 0.091 0.015 -0.055 -0.120 
Variant 12 0.178 0.063 -0.041 -0.134 -0.219 -0.364 -0.426 -0.482 -0.533 -0.578 
Variant 13 -0.567 -0.604 -0.638 -0.669 -0.697 -0.747 -0.769 -0.789 -0.807 -0.823 
Variant 14 -0.312 -0.384 -0.448 -0.505 -0.557 -0.644 -0.681 -0.715 -0.744 -0.771 
Variant 15 0.993 1.166 1.353 1.556 1.777 2.278 2.562 2.870 3.205 3.568 
Av. Market 
Share  0.801 0.676 0.560 0.453 0.352 0.172 0.091 -0.015 -0.055 -0.120 
Own-Price 
Elasticity -9.937 -8.586 -7.387 -6.315 -5.351 -3.686 -2.963 -2.301 -1.692 -1.129 
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Taken together, the estimation results show that a narrow price-gap between 
private labels in a retailers’ portfolio results in increased brand similarity. When the gap 
is small customers cannot distinguish between brands in different price-quality tiers. This 
results in increased intraportfolio competition and cannibalization between upper-tier and 
low-tier brands. Importantly, high brand similarity results in reduced private label market 
shares. The loss in market share can be attributed to the consumers’ desire for highly 
differentiated private labels. Currently, retailers are not offering that as their brands are 
highly similar which may result in customers looking for an outside option. In all these 
results aid in explaining the low relatively private label market shares in emerging 
economies.  
Managerial Implications  
My findings are immediately relevant to private-label brand managers, but go beyond to 
provide more general comment on retailing and product portfolios in general. First, the 
results show that when the brand similarity between two brands within a portfolio is very 
small, brand managers can make decisions pertaining to a brand with less regard to the 
feedback effect it will have from brands in other tiers.  However, high brand similarity 
requires managers to pay close attention when implementing promotion strategies within 
a portfolio so as to reduce cannibalization. In fact, frequent price promotions result in 
price overlap between brands which may exacerbate the effects of cannibalization. 
Second, my findings also provide some important insight that helps our 
understanding of how managers can benefit from managing cannibalization in both the 
short and long terms.  In the short term, private label portfolio managers should avoid 
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promotional strategies that cause the promoted price of their brand to violate clear 
identification from other brands. Price promotion may provide short-term sales gains, but 
the long-term negative impact on brand identity cannot be ignored. However, in the long-
term, the degree of competition among the brands can help in the defining portfolio 
pruning strategies as the retailer can use brand similarity to decide on which brand to 
discontinue within its portfolio. 
Last, retailers can use brand similarity to build private label portfolios that have 
minimum cannibalization rates thereby improving profitability. More specifically, the 
brands within the portfolios should highly differentiated from each other.  For example, my 
results show that cannibalization is high when brands are close in attribute space. 
Therefore, retailers can reduce cannibalization by differentiating the attributes of their 
brands within the portfolio. For instance, they can add an organic brand to target a 
different segment of the market. 
Conclusion 
In this study I examine whether the price-gap between private labels within a 
retailers’ private label portfolio has an effect on private label market shares.  I find that a 
narrow price-gap between brands in a portfolio results in high brand similarity, a 
minimally differentiated portfolios, and subsequently low private label market shares. 
This suggests that retailers’ private label portfolio management strategies may also in part 
explain the relatively low private label market shares in emerging markets.  
The results from this study also generalize beyond the market and products 
considered here. In fact, this result can translate to any type of brand portfolio. For 
example, car manufacturers such as Honda and Nissan can use results from this study 
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when pricing vehicles within their portfolios. For example, Nissan have Nissan Rogue 
and Nissan Juke in their crossover segment (the price-gap between the two is narrow), 
whereas Honda have only the CR-V in the same category. In fact the CR-V is the 
segment leader followed closely by the Nissan Rogue. However, the Nissan Juke is least 
popular cars in the segment. Nissan can therefore, examine whether the price-gap 
between their two brands in the crossover segments impacts their total market share in the 
segment.  
As with most research, this research is also subject to limitations despite its 
contribution to some interesting findings. The primary limitation of this research is that it 
considers only one product category in a single market, potentially limiting the 
generalizability to other countries. For example, prior research on private labels in the US 
finds that proximity to national brands is an optimal strategy for private labels as it 
facilitates easier comparison to national brands (Choi et al 2006). Therefore having a 
portfolio of private labels that is closer to national brands may have a different effect in 
such a market, this an area future research can explore. In addition future research can 
also look into what strategies retailers can employ to decrease cannibalization within 
private label portfolios, particularly when brands similarity is high. For example, I can 
look into determining the optimal price-gap between upper-tier and low-tier brands that 
maximizes market shares. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE CONSUMER PARADOX: WHY BOTTOM-TIER CONSUMERS ARE LOYAL 
TO BRAND NAMES 
Abstract 
Recent studies on private labels find that store brand consumers tend to be middle 
income, educated, older consumers with large families. Moreover, low-income 
households that have the same needs as wealthier households do not economize by 
buying a greater proportion of private-label products. Instead they prefer higher priced 
national brands. In this chapter, I investigate how effective persuasion appeals 
(descriptive appeals and informational appeals) are at motivating low-income consumers 
to buy private labels. In so doing, I provide insight into the underlying cause of why low-
income consumers do not buy private labels from which they would benefit significantly. 
I find that informational appeals are the most effective way of increasing private label 
consumption. I also find that descriptive appeals that are based on the preferences of 
aspirational reference groups also encourage low-income consumers to buy private 
labels. Taken together the results suggest that low income consumers do not buy private 
labels mainly because they are unknowledgeable about them and that they want to align 
themselves with an aspirational group (high-income consumers) whom they believe 
consume national brands. 
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Introduction 
In the past, private labels were targeted toward low-income households.  These 
households were most likely to buy them as they are price sensitive, and generally have 
lower disposable income (Starzynski 1993; Hoch 1996; Baltas and Doyle 1998).  
However, this trend appears to have changed. With the introduction of new types of 
private label products (new categories), and the improvement in private label quality, 
different types of consumers are now private label shoppers11. Admittedly, Kaufman et al 
(1997) and Bronnenburg et al (2015), find that current private label consumers tend to be 
high to middle-income, educated, and mature with large families. In fact, low-income 
consumers prefer national brands to private labels, despite the fact that private labels are 
often a less-expensive option12. These findings are somewhat counterintuitive as low-
income households, with presumably the same needs as wealthier households, do not 
economize by buying a greater proportion of private label products, but rather consume 
more costly national brands.  In this research I seek to determine which persuasion 
appeals are most effective at motivating low-income consumers to buy private labels. In 
so doing, my work also provides insight into the underlying cause that up to this point has 
prevented low-income consumers from purchasing less expensive products from which 
they would benefit significantly. 
                                                          
11 Heraud (2006) finds that affluent households have been the main driver of private label growth as they 
represent the fastest-growing market segment. 
12 This is not unique to the USA, e.g. in South Africa middle-income and high-income households have 
increased private label consumption, whereas low-income groups have reduced consumption (Euromonitor, 
2013).  
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Apart from premium private labels, private label prices in most categories are 
significantly less than those of national brands, therefore, buying them saves money13. 
This is particularly important for low income consumers as they spend a significant 
portion of their income on necessities (Orhun and Palazzolo 2016).  Therefore, 
consuming private labels may be beneficial especially accounting for the fact that they 
are now little differences in quality or value between private labels and national brands 
(Sethuraman and Gielens 2014).  
A number of industry and academic findings support that private label quality has 
greatly improved. For example, expert quality rankings by consumer advocacy 
publications such as Consumer Reports and the Good Housekeeping Research Institute 
(GHRI) confirm that today the objective quality of many private labels is if not equal to 
or greater than, the objective quality of comparable national brands. For example, in a 
2013 study Consumer Reports compared brands in a number of product categories14 and 
found that in 33 of 57 product categories, private label products’ quality was either 
equivalent to or better than competing national brands. Similarly, the Good 
Housekeeping Research Institute (GHRI) (2014) used blind taste tests in 29 different 
product categories, and also found that consumers considered private label and national 
brands to have the same objective quality in 19 categories with national brands winning 
in six categories and private labels coming out tops in four.  
                                                          
13 In the South African Market although the price-gap between national brands and private labels is 
relatively small, on average private labels in a number of categories cost less than national brands.  
14 These included among others ice cream, trail mix, mixed vegetables, fruit juice, paper towels, ketchup, 
maple syrup, mayonnaise, cheese and seafood.  
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Furthermore, prior studies on private labels find that the gap between private 
labels and national brand quality has narrowed significantly. For example, Davies and 
Brito (2004) examine consumer's preferences for national and private labels by analyzing 
brand attributes – taste and price. In blind taste tests in four food product categories they 
find that even though most of the consumers in the sample claimed that they usually 
consume national brands in butter, breakfast cereal, crackers and mayonnaise only a very 
small percentage where able to differentiate between private labels and national brands. 
Further, they also found that brand image rather than quality is often the only explanation 
for the higher prices consumers pay to acquire national brands. Similar results were found 
by Wulf et al (2005) and Lybeck et al (2006) who identified that most consumers see 
virtually no difference between private labels and national brands. In fact, even “heavy” 
national brand users often cannot differentiate between national brands and private labels 
in blind taste tests.  
In the South African market, a number of tests by consumer advocacy 
organizations also confirm that private label products have quality that either matches or 
exceeds national brands.  For example, most recently the Good Housekeeping Research 
Institute (2016) tested brands from various product categories15. They found that in most 
categories private labels matched national brands on quality. However, not all private 
labels fared the same, private labels from Pick n Pay, Checkers, Woolworths and Spar 
performed relatively better against national brands than private labels from other retailers.  
These findings are consistent with prior research which shows that consumers in the 
                                                          
15 They included among others orange juice, peanut butter, chocolate spread, ready-mix flour, bran muffins, 
puff pastries, tea, butter, coffee, cake mix, milk, breakfast cereals, ketchup, canned tomatoes, baked beans, 
and ice cream. 
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South Africa market generally have positive quality perceptions of private labels from 
Pick n Pay, Checkers, Woolworths and Spar (Beneke 2009).  
In order to motivate low income consumers into purchasing private labels two 
types of appeals (informational appeals and descriptive appeals) can be employed. 
Informational appeals are designed to target the rationality of consumers by providing 
objective information on brand quality, price promotions and product attributes (Cutler et 
al 2000).  Presenting consumers with factual and objectively verifiable product 
information increases purchase intentions and results in favorable brand attitudes 
(Maddux and Rogers 1980; Pallak, Murroni, and Koch 1983). Thus, in this study I 
investigate the effectiveness of informational appeals in motivating low-income 
consumers to purchase private labels. 
On the other hand, descriptive appeals are emotive and are often based on social 
influence (Cialdini et al 2006). The impact of social influence on consumer behavior in a 
retail setting is well documented. It plays a key role in shaping consumer preferences.  
For example, interactive social influence, such as being aided by sales assistants or 
shopping with friends, (Sharma and Levy 2003; Mangleburg et al 2004; Kurt, Inman, and 
Argo 2011) impacts not only the amount of money consumers spend on each shopping 
trip, but also the frequency of store visits and overall customer emotions. Similarly, a 
noninteractive social presence, such as the “mere presence” of others who may not be 
involved nor attempt to engage the other consumer in any way have an effect on 
consumers’ emotions, self-presentation behaviors and ultimately purchase decisions 
(Dahl, Manchanda, and Argo 2001; Argo, Dahl, and Manchanda 2005).  Therefore, in 
this study I also contribute to the social influence literature by examining the 
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effectiveness of descriptive appeals in motivating low-income consumers to purchase 
private labels. 
I contrast the effectiveness of informational appeals and descriptive appeals using 
a series of economic experiments. I conduct my experiments in the US and in South 
Africa. I chose to conduct my experiments in these countries primarily because private 
label consumption patterns among low-income households are similar. Moreover, in the 
South African market there is a large number of low-income consumers, and a substantial 
proportion of them prefer national brands. Importantly, conducting the study in two 
countries allows me to compare the effectiveness of the different types of persuasion 
appeals across culturally diverse populations (i.e. independent and interdependent).    
My findings show that informational appeals are the most effective way to 
convince low-income consumers to buy private labels. In fact, providing consumers with 
information regarding product attributes and quality increases private label purchase 
intentions and willingness to pay in both the US and South Africa.  Moreover, across 
both countries I find that descriptive appeals that focus on aspirational reference groups  
are also an effective way of prompting low-income consumers to buy private labels, 
albeit not as effective as informational appeals. My results also reveal that the least 
effective appeals, are descriptive appeals that highlight low-income consumers as the 
primary customers of private labels. In other words, descriptive appeals that highlight 
consumption patterns of other low-income consumers (i.e. in-group members). In fact, in 
the US study they result in significantly lower purchase intentions and willingness to pay 
for private labels. Last,   I also find that the appeals are much more effective in hedonic 
categories as compared to utilitarian product categories.  
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 My research contributes to the existing literature by showing the effectiveness of 
different types of appeals when marketing presumably low status products to low-income 
individuals. Importantly, in so doing, I am also able to provide initial insights as to why 
low-income consumers have been found to not purchase private label products (Kaufman 
et al 1997; Bronnenburg et al 2015). At a more general level, I validate the importance of 
social influence in a grocery retail setting and the presence of status seeking behavior in 
non-durable products that are consumed mostly in private.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In the next section I 
develop my research framework and formulate hypotheses on how descriptive persuasion 
appeals and informational appeals can be employed as persuasion techniques to motivate 
behavioral change among low-income consumers. In the subsequent section I describe 
how the effectiveness of the different types of appeals vary between hedonic and 
utilitarian product categories. In the third section, I explain the design and execution of 
my experiment which I then use to test my hypotheses. Last, I discuss the results, offer 
managerial implications and formulate conclusions. 
Research Framework 
A consistent finding in research on consumer decision making is that social influence 
plays a pervasive role in forming consumer attitudes toward products, brands, and 
services (Dahl, Manchanda, and Argo 2001). Recognizing the impact of social influence, 
to attract consumers, marketers frequently account for social influence when attempting 
to persuade individuals to buy their products or services (Cutler et al 2000). In fact, 
persuasion is a type of social influence in which consumers are prompted into adopting 
ideas, attitudes, or course of action by symbolic means. The main goal of persuasion is to 
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change or strengthen attitude towards a certain product, brand or service. (Cutler et al 
2000).  
Prior research on persuasion highlights the important role of social groups, in 
particular reference groups in shaping consumer choice. Generally, persuasion attempts 
are more effective when they are from in-group members as opposed to out-group 
members (Mackie, Worth and Asuncion 1990). This is because in-group members are 
similar and usually have shared opinions, which results in them processing information 
from other in-group members in a more structured manner than information from out-
group members (McGarty et al 1994). Consequently, consumers are relatively easily 
persuaded by arguments that reference in-group members. 
However, when it comes to low-status in-groups (e.g. low-income households) 
group members may dissociate from their own group in order to enhance their identities 
(Kirchmeyer, 2002).  In fact, they may display favoritism toward a higher status group, 
despite not being a member of it (Simon et al 1995). Importantly, they may perceive their 
group as dissociative reference group (i.e. a negative group that an individual shuns and 
does not want to be associated with). In this case persuasion attempts by in-group 
members are likely to be ineffective. Likewise, persuasion attempts by out-group 
members are also far less effective except in instances where the in-group members view 
the out-group as an aspirational reference group (i.e. a positive group that an individual 
aspires to be member of, but to which they do not belong) (Wilder 1984). In that case, the 
aspirational reference group is influential in that it may provide greater motivation for in-
group members.  
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Descriptive Appeals 
Past studies find that aspirational reference groups are positively viewed and that 
group members are often revered (Childers and Rao 1992; Cialdini et al 2006). As such, 
products that are associated with aspirational reference groups are positively valued, 
particularly by low-status individuals (Taylor and Lobel 1989; Zeelenberg and Pieters 
2011). As a matter of fact, low income consumers often view high income consumers as 
aspirational reference groups, which results in them desiring products and services that 
are supposedly consumed by high income individuals (Aspinwall and Taylor 1993). For 
example, prior studies find that low-income individuals spend a disproportionate amount 
of their income on status-laden brands.  In fact, they speciously signal their wealth by 
consuming brands that are a surrogate for income, such as expensive luxury and status-
laden brands which are primarily targeted for high-income individuals (Mandel et al 
2006; Sivanathan and Pettit 2010; Banerjee and Duflo 2007; Han  et al 2010). Moreover, 
their need for social status is positively correlated with conspicuous consumption, as they 
purchase brands to signal social status rather than for their inherent objective or 
subjective value. This suggests that descriptive appeals targeted at low-income 
consumers that draw from aspirational reference groups can be an effective way to 
motivate them to buy private labels.  
On the other hand, low-income individuals may also strongly identify with other 
low-income individuals; this emanates from a desire to be a part of a normative group 
with shared characteristics (Hogg 2003). Moreover, this strong in-group identification 
can result in a need to identify with others through the possession and use of products and 
brands thereby influencing purchase decisions. For example, Escalas and Bettman, 
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(2005) find that consumers who see themselves as part of a group often use products or 
brands associated with that group. In that case it makes sense to frame descriptive 
persuasion appeals directed at low-income consumers in such a way that they resemble 
the consumption patterns of other low-income consumers.  
However, low-income consumers may also consider fellow low-income 
consumers as a dissociative reference group. The desire to avoid dissociative reference 
groups influences not only consumer preferences but also purchase intent. For example, 
self-presentation concerns often result in consumers shunning brands or products linked 
to a dissociative reference group. White and Dahl (2006), show that males are less 
motivated to select, a product associated with females (i.e. a dissociative reference group) 
than a neutral product. Moreover, they find that products and brands associated with 
dissociative reference groups have a larger effect on consumers’ negative self-brand 
connections, choices and purchase intentions. These findings suggest that descriptive 
appeals that highlight what low-income consumers are doing may be ineffective at 
motivating fellow low income households into buying private labels. Therefore, taking 
into account that low-income consumers can either dissociate or identify with fellow low-
income individuals, descriptive persuasion appeals that focus on low-income household’s 
consumption patterns may either prompt or discourage low-income consumers into 
buying private labels.   
Informational Appeals 
Informational appeals provide meaningful facts about the product or brand to the 
consumer. Specifically, they focus directly on providing information on features, product 
attributes or benefits of the product itself (Cutler et al 2000). Knowledge on product 
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quality and attributes shapes both consumers preferences and purchase intentions. In fact, 
purchase decisions of informed and uninformed consumers vary greatly. For example, 
current research finds that compared to high-information consumers, low-information 
consumers are likely to pay for more for food products (Kaufman et al 1997). This is 
because they have limited knowledge of price distributions, and therefore are more likely 
to shop at random stores where prices maybe higher (Stiglitz 1977; Jain and Srivastava 
2000). Moreover, they have a positive cost for searching for the lowest-price store, which 
leads them to observe only a single price prior to purchasing.  
In most cases low-income individuals have limited market information. This is 
because they attain lower levels of education which may result in limited understanding 
of not only product quality but also product attributes. For example, low-income 
households have been shown to have lower financial literacy which results in a lower 
propensity to engage in strategies that allow them to navigate markets and save money 
(Agarwal et al 2009; Delaney and Doyle 2012). Further, low income individuals have 
less information on product attributes and quality as they rarely search all available 
information concerning a specific product or brand prior to purchase (Berman and Evans 
2010). They are also less likely to read product labels and panel information, which also 
constrains their knowledge of product quality (Sullivan 2003). Therefore, it is highly 
likely that low-income consumers have limited information and understanding about 
private labels in general or advancements in private label relative quality suggesting that 
informational appeals that highlight product quality and attributes maybe an effective 
way to motivate them to buy private labels.  
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The Moderating Role of Product Categories. 
Consumer choices are also driven by hedonic and utilitarian considerations 
(Holbrook and Hirschman 1982). The hedonic dimension, results from sensations derived 
from the experience of using products. Thus, hedonic products are those that provide 
gratification from sensory attributes such as tastes, sounds, aromas, tactile sensations and 
visual images, which are much more subjectively than objectively oriented16. The second 
dimension, the utilitarian dimension results from functions performed by products; for 
example, utilitarian products are those whose consumption is more cognitively focused to 
fulfill functional or practical tasks17 (Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000). This product 
classification can influence the effectiveness of both descriptive persuasion appeals and 
informational appeals on consumers’ choices between private labels and national brands.  
Low income consumers may prefer to buy more national brands in the utilitarian 
product category as opposed to the hedonic product category mainly because the level of 
risk (uncertainty regarding the efficacy of a brand) may be higher in utilitarian products. 
In general, low-income consumers, are risk averse as they may not be in a financial 
position to make poor purchase decisions by buying a product that is not effective (Batra 
and Sinha 1999). Therefore, low-income households can only afford to make mistakes in 
the hedonic product category where costs maybe inconsequential. For example, the costs 
incurred in consuming private label ice cream which does not taste quite as good as 
national brands are far less than those incurred from consuming private label laundry 
detergent that is not as effective as the national brand alternatives. Therefore, the effect of 
                                                          
16 Examples of hedonic products include ice-cream, ketchup, yogurt and soft drinks. 
17 Examples include toilet paper, paper towels, bottled water and laundry detergent. 
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the appeals may be stronger in the hedonic product categories as compared to the 
utilitarian product categories.  
I test my hypotheses in two laboratory experiments, one in the US (study 1) and 
the other in South Africa (Study 2). In both studies I investigate whether a descriptive 
appeal that informs low-income consumers about the consumption patterns of high-
income households is as effective as either a descriptive appeal that highlights 
consumption patterns of low-income consumers or an informational appeal that 
highlights product attributes and product quality of private labels. I also assess whether 
product category (utilitarian versus hedonic) impacts the effectiveness of the appeals. 
Last, as a secondary goal I seek to substantiate whether low-income households prefer 
national brands to private labels.  
Pretest  
In order to identify which products and brands to use in my study I conducted a pretest. 
The pretest helped determine which brands consumers regard as either high status or low 
status, and products they consider hedonic or utilitarian.  Following Mandel (2006), for 
the US study (study 1) I asked 120 MTurk participants to rate brands from various 
product categories on a 7-point scale that ranges from 1 (very low status) to 7 (very high 
status). In addition, I asked the participants to classify products as either hedonic or 
utilitarian goods using Batra and Ahtola’s (1990) eight-item semantic differential scale. I 
tested twenty three products that past research (Ratchford 1987) suggests vary in terms of 
being perceived as hedonic or utilitarian. And for each product I tested the status of 8 
brands (4 national brands and 4 private labels).  
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For the product category designation, I found that ketchup, yogurt, soft drinks and 
ice cream loaded heavily on the hedonic factors,18 and that toilet paper, bottled water, 
paper towels and detergent loaded heavily on the utilitarian factors19 Subsequently, I used 
these products in my study.   For the brands, in all the aforementioned categories I found 
that national brands rated significantly higher in status than private labels20 21.   
For the South African study I used brands from the utilitarian product category 
(bath soap, laundry detergent, household cleaners) 22, and hedonic product category 
(yogurt, ketchup, cookies)23. Similar to the US study I also found that the participants 
generally rated private labels as low status brands and national brands as high status 
brands.  
Study 1 
For this study participants were drawn from households representative of the general US 
consumer-population. However, I focused primarily on low income consumers.  I tasked 
a marketing research company (Qualtrics) the responsibility of recruiting low-income 
participants (annual household income less than $40,000)24. They recruited 250 
                                                          
18 Pleasant/unpleasant, agreeable/disagreeable, happy/sad  
19 Valuable/worthless, helpful/unhelpful, agreeable/disagreeable 
20 Ketchup brands (Hunts, Heinz, Delmonte, Great Value, Kroger, Market Pantry), Yogurt brands 
(Chobani, Oikos, Yoplait, Kroger, Great Value, Market Pantry). Soft drink brands (Coca cola, Pepsi, Dr 
Pepper, Sam’s cola, Big K, Refreshe), Ice-cream brands (Blue Bell, Haggen Dasz, Blue Bunny, Great 
Value, Kroger, Market pantry 
21 Toilet Paper brands (Charmin, Quilted Northern, Angel Soft, Kroger, Great Value, Market Essentials), 
Bottled water brands (Aquafina, Fiji, Dasani, Kroger, Great Value, Market Pantry), Paper towel brands 
(Bounty, Brawny, Viva, Kroger, Great Value, Signature Home), Laundry detergent brands (Gain, Tide, All, 
Kroger, Great Value, Up & Up). 
22 Laundry detergent brands (Surf, Omo, Sunlight, PnP, Spar, Ritebrand), Bath Soap brands (Protex, Lux, 
Dettol, PnP, Spar, Ritebrand), Household Cleaners brands (Handy Andy, Domestos, Dettol, PnP, Spar, 
Ritebrand) 
23 Yogurt (Nutriday, Parmalat, Clover, PnP, Spar, Woolworths), Ketchup brands (All Gold, Heinz, All Joy, 
PnP, Spar, Ritebrand), Cookie brands (Bakers, Baumanns, Moirs PnP, Spar, Ritebrand) 
24 The Bureau of Labor Statistics classifies households with annual income that is below $40,000 as being 
in the low income tier along with 29% of all households in the Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale area. 
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participants from the Phoenix, Arizona metropolitan area. The ages of the participants 
ranged from 18 to 82 (mean 45.47, median 44). 42.4% were male and 57.6% were 
female. The average household size was 2.55 persons and the average education was 
19.03 years. 
Procedure 
My experiment had four between-subjects conditions: aspirational descriptive 
appeal, in-group descriptive appeal, informational appeal, and a control group. In the 
aspirational descriptive appeal condition, the participants read an article that included 
statistics highlighting that high income households are the major consumers of private 
labels. For example, the article included statements such as: “studies show that 85% of 
high-income households consume the most private labels”. In the in-group descriptive 
appeal condition, respondents read an article similar to the one read by respondents in the 
aspirational descriptive appeal with the only difference being that the statistics described 
the preferences of low-income households. For example, the article included statements 
such as: “studies show that 85% of low-income households consume the most private 
labels”. In the informational appeal condition, participants read an article describing how 
private labels’ objective quality has improved and is now close to, if not equal to or 
greater than, the objective quality of comparable national brands. The article also 
highlighted that some private labels are produced by the same manufacturers who make 
leading national brands. Last, in the control condition, participants read an ostensibly 
unrelated news article. In this case, they read an article mundanely describing the game of 
cricket.  
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I then asked the participants to quantify their purchase intentions and willingness 
to pay for 6 brands (3 national brands and 3 private labels) drawn from 8 products (4 
hedonic and 4 utilitarian). However to avoid ordering effects and fatigue, I split the 
participants into two groups with each group only responding to brands from 4 products 
(2 hedonic and 2 utilitarian).  
Purchase intentions were measured using a seven-point scale which asked participants to 
indicate how likely they would be to buy the product (1 = very unlikely to buy, 7 = very 
likely to buy). 
In addition, I measured the participants’ perceived childhood socioeconomic 
status (childhood SES) and their current socioeconomic status (current SES). I used these 
measures to validate the participants’ socioeconomic status. These two were assessed 
using measures established by Griskevicius, Delton et al (2011) and Griskevicius, 
Ackerman et al (2013).  To determine childhood SES, I asked participants to respond to 
the following three statements on a 9-point scale from 1, strongly disagree, to 9, strongly 
agree: “My family usually had enough money for things when I was growing up,” “I 
grew up in a relatively wealthy neighborhood,” and “I felt relatively wealthy compared to 
the other kids in my school.” The Cronbach’s alpha, calculated across participants for 
childhood SES averaged 0.78. The mean score was 4.7 (SD = 1.65), which was slightly 
above the midpoint of the scale. Scores ranged from 1 to 8.33, with 65.3% of participants 
scoring below 4 and 3.7% scoring just above 7. 
To determine current SES, participants responded to three other items. “I have 
enough money to buy things I want,” “I don’t need to worry too much about paying my 
bills,” and “I don’t think I’ll have to worry about money too much in the future.”  The 
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Cronbach’s alpha, calculated across participants for current SES averaged 0.85. In this 
case, the mean score was 3.69 (SD = 1.88), which was slightly below the midpoint of the 
scale. Scores ranged from 1 to 7.6, with 74.3% of participants scoring below 4.0 and 
1.7% of participants scoring above 7. The correlation between current and childhood SES 
was 0.29. Both measures confirmed that indeed the participants were low socioeconomic 
status consumers. 
Results  
Preliminary Analyses. I performed a series of t-tests and found that on average, the 
participants’ purchase intentions were higher for national brands as compared to private 
labels (𝑀 = 6.31 𝑣𝑠.𝑀 = 4.75), 𝑝 < 0.001). Moreover, they were willing to pay more 
for national brands as compared to private labels(𝑀 = 6.15 𝑣𝑠.𝑀 = 3.6, 𝑝 < 0.001). 
This provided cursory evidence that low-income consumers prefer national brands to 
private labels. 
Test of Hypotheses To examine the effects of the appeals on private label 
purchase intentions, I conducted an analysis of variance (ANOVA), using the appeals as 
the independent variable and a purchase intentions index as the dependent variable. I 
found a significant main effect of the experimental conditions on purchase 
intentions. (𝐹 (2, 04) =  60.42, 𝑝 < 0.001). I then conducted post hoc tests. My results 
revealed that purchase intentions of the participants from descriptive appeals and 
informational appeals conditions were significantly different from the control group. 
Specifically, the purchase intentions of participants in the aspirational descriptive appeal 
condition (𝑀 = 3.05, (𝑡)8.26, 𝑝 < 0.001) were significantly higher than for those in the 
control. I also found that the purchase intentions of the participants within the in-group 
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descriptive appeal condition were significantly lower (𝑀 = −0.39, (𝑡) − 2.08, 𝑝 < 0.05) 
than the control group suggesting that low-income consumers dissociate from other low-
income consumers. Last, my results showed that, participants in the informational appeal 
condition also had purchase intentions that are significantly higher than those in the 
control group condition (𝑀 = 3.44, (𝑡)9.34, 𝑝 < 0.001). In fact, the participants in this 
condition had the highest purchase intentions of all the groups.  
Last, I evaluated the effect of product category on purchase intentions for private 
labels. I conducted a two-way mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the product 
category. There was a significant main effect of product category (𝐹(26, 95) =
 21.54, 𝑝 <  0.001). This effect suggests that if we ignore the treatments, purchase 
intentions were significantly different between the product categories. In fact, the 
participants’ purchase intentions were higher in the hedonic product categories as 
compared to the utilitarian product categories (𝑀 = 4.876 𝑣𝑠 4.461, 𝑝 < 0.001). 
However, there was no significant interaction between the product category and the 
conditions (𝐹 (1, 37) = 1.373, 𝑝 <  0.251) .This suggests that of the effect of the 
appeals on purchase intentions were not different for hedonic and utilitarian product 
categories.  
To determine whether participants’ private label willingness to pay was also 
significantly influenced by the appeals I conducted another ANOVA. I found a 
significant main effect of the experimental conditions on willingness to pay (𝐹 (4.93)  =
 2.59, 𝑝 <  0.05). I then conducted post hoc tests, here, I found that participants in the 
aspirational descriptive appeal condition and the informational appeal conditions were 
willing to pay more for private labels (𝑀 = 1.78, (𝑡)2.00, 𝑝 < 0.05) and 
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(𝑀 = 1.86, (𝑡)2.09, 𝑝 < 0.05) respectively, than participants in the control condition. 
However, I did not find a significant effect for the in-group descriptive appeal 
condition (𝑀 = 0.17, (𝑡)0.20, 𝑝 <  0.124). As in the purchase intensions model, the 
informational appeal condition had the largest impact on private label willingness to pay. 
I also evaluated the effect of product category on private labels willingness to pay. 
Specifically, I conducted another two-way mixed ANOVA and found a significant main 
effect of product category (𝐹(24, 94)  =  61,79, 𝑝 < 0.001) suggesting that, private 
label willingness to pay was significantly different between the product categories. In 
fact, the participants’ willingness to pay was higher in the hedonic product categories as 
compared to the utilitarian product categories (𝑀 = 3.88, 𝑣𝑠 2.751, 𝑝 < 0.001).  
However, there was also no significant interaction between the product category and the 
conditions 𝐹 (6, 06)  =  24.03, 𝑝 <  0.612) implying that the effect of the appeals on 
willingness to pay was not different for hedonic and utilitarian product categories.  
Discussion  
Study 1 provided empirical support for my hypotheses. Consistent with the first 
hypothesis, I found that low-income consumers are upward comparing; that is, they 
consider higher income households as an aspirational reference group. Therefore, 
descriptive appeals that match consumptions patterns of high income households result in 
increased private label purchase intentions willingness to pay.  The results also showed 
that descriptive appeals that match consumption patterns of low-income consumers 
negatively impact private label preferences. Taken together these results confirm the role 
of social influence on consumption patterns of low-income households and suggest that 
one of the reasons low-income consumers are not currently purchasing private labels is 
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they believe that high-income consumers buy national brands, and  as such, they desire to 
emulate their consumptions patterns. Moreover, low-income consumers also avoid 
buying private labels because they associate them with not only low status but also other 
low-income individuals which they seek to dissociate from. 
 Importantly, Study 1 also revealed that informational appeals are the most 
effective method of increasing private labels preferences for low-income households. 
This result suggests that the main reason low-income consumers are not buying private 
labels is that they may be lacking information about private labels. Evidently, 
highlighting the salient attributes of private labels motivates low-income consumers to 
buy them. Moreover, the effect of this appeal is stronger than that of descriptive appeals.   
These results, however, describe behavior among consumers in a highly 
developed consumer market. In study 2, I conduct the analysis in an emerging market. 
This allows me to investigate why low income consumers in emerging economies do not 
consume private labels, and why private label market shares are low in emerging 
economies.  Therefore, I test which is more effective, descriptive appeals or 
informational appeals at motivating low-income households to increase their private 
labels consumption in South Africa.  
Study 2 
For this study, the experiment participants were drawn from households representative of 
the lower-income strata of the general South African consumer-population. The 
participants were recruited through a marketing research company (Acentric). In total 244 
 
 
106 
 
low-income participants (annual household income less than $15,000)25 from the 
Johannesburg metropolitan area were recruited. The ages of the participants ranged from 
18 to 76 (mean 36.03, median 32). 66.04% were female and 33.96% male. The average 
household size was 3.66 persons and most had more than 15.9 years of education. The 
participants, childhood SES scores ranged from 1 to 9, and the mean score was 4.33 (SD 
= 2.19), which was as expected lower than that of consumers in the US. Similarly, the 
mean score for the current SES was 3.73 (SD = 1.97), was again lower than that of US 
consumers.  
The experimental set-up was a direct replication of the US experiment, albeit with 
a different manipulation in the control group were participants read an article about how 
the National Football League (NFL) was founded.   
Results  
Preliminary Analyses. I performed a series of t-tests and my results revealed that 
contrasted to private labels the participants’ purchase intentions for national brands were 
higher (𝑀 = 6.76 𝑣𝑠.𝑀 =  4.79, 𝑝 < 0.001). In addition, the participants’ willingness to 
pay for national brands (𝑀 = 18.42 𝑣𝑠.𝑀 = 13.22, 𝑝 < 0.001) was also much higher 
than that of private labels. This also provided cursory evidence that low-income 
consumers prefer private labels.  
Test of Hypotheses. I conducted an analysis of variance (ANOVA), using the 
appeals as the independent variable and a purchase intentions index as the dependent 
variable. I found a significant main effect of the experimental conditions on purchase 
                                                          
25 The South African Audience Research classifies households with annual income that is below R15, 000 
as being in the low income tier.  
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intentions (𝐹 (1, 46)  =  16.40, 𝑝 < 0.001). I then conducted post hoc tests and, found 
that, the participants’ purchases intentions within the conditions were also significantly 
different from the control group.  Specifically, the purchase intentions of participants in 
the aspirational descriptive appeal  (𝑀 = 1.51, (𝑡)5.34, 𝑝 < 0.001) and informational 
appeal condition (𝑀 = 1.88, (𝑡)6.29, 𝑝 < 0.001) are were significantly higher than for 
those in the control condition. These results are not only consistent with hypotheses 1 and 
3 but they are also qualitatively similar to my findings in the US market.  
Contrary to the results from Study 1, however, the purchase intentions of the 
participants within the in-group descriptive appeal were significantly higher (𝑀 =
1.47, (𝑡)5.26, 𝑝 < 0.001) than the control group suggesting that low-income households 
conform to group preferences. I also examined the effect of product category on purchase 
intentions for private labels. Here, I conducted a two-way mixed ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the product category. There was a significant main effect of product 
category (𝐹(19, 11) = 23.57, 𝑝 < 0.001). This effect suggests that if the treatments are 
disregarded, purchase intentions were significantly different between the product 
categories. However, unlike in the US study, the participants’ purchase intentions were 
higher in the utilitarian product categories as compared to the hedonic product 
categories (𝑀 = 5.025 𝑣𝑠 4.545, 𝑝 < 0.001). I also found that, there was no significant 
interaction between the product category and the conditions (𝐹 (0, 54) =  0.67, 𝑝 <
 0.654) suggesting that of the effect of the appeals on purchase intentions were not 
different for hedonic and utilitarian product categories.  
To determine whether participants’ private label willingness to pay was also 
significantly influenced by the type of appeal I conducted a second ANOVA. I found a 
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significant main effect of the experimental conditions on willingness to pay (𝐹 (6, 67) =
 3.78, 𝑝 < 0.05). I followed that with post hoc tests. The, results indicated that the 
appeals’ impact on willingness to pay for private labels are generally similar to the 
purchase intentions results. Much like in the US market, I found that participants in the 
informational appeal and the aspirational descriptive appeal conditions are willing to pay 
more for private labels (𝑀 = 4.51, (𝑡)3.01, 𝑝 < 0.05) and (𝑀 = 2.42, (𝑡)2.14, 𝑝 <
0.05) respectively, than participants in the control condition. I also found that 
participants in the dissociative appeal condition were willing to pay more for private 
labels (𝑀 = 2.64, (𝑡)2.37, 𝑝 < 0.05) than participants in not only the control condition 
but also the aspirational descriptive appeal condition. Last, I evaluated the effect of 
product category on willingness to pay for private labels. A two-way mixed ANOVA 
with repeated measures on the product category revealed a significant main effect of 
product category (𝐹(49, 95)  =  20.06, 𝑝 < 0.001) implying that the participants’ 
willingness to pay was significantly different between the product categories. I also found 
that the participants’ willingness was higher in the utilitarian product categories as 
compared to the hedonic product categories (𝑀 = 14.367 𝑣𝑠 𝑀 = 5.131, 𝑝 < 0.001). 
Moreover, I also found a significant interaction between the product category and the 
conditions 𝐹 (10, 39) = 1.05, 𝑝 < 0.001). This implies that the effect of the appeals on 
willingness to pay were significantly different for hedonic and utilitarian product 
categories. Post hoc analysis revealed that in the aspirational descriptive appeal condition 
participants’ willingness to pay was higher in the hedonic product categories as compared 
to the utilitarian product categories (𝑀 = 15.42, 𝑣𝑠 𝑀 = 7.99, 𝑝 < 0.001). This was also 
true for the participants within the in-group descriptive appeal condition  (𝑀 =
 
 
109 
 
19.98, 𝑣𝑠 𝑀 = 12.23, 𝑝 < 0.001) and the informational appeal (𝑀 = 17.52, 𝑣𝑠 𝑀 =
10.32, 𝑝 < 0.001).  
Discussion  
In sum, study 2 provided further support that the informational appeals are most 
effective at motivating low-income consumers to buy private labels. These results 
suggests that low-income consumers may not be buying private labels simply because 
they are not well informed about them. This paucity of information on private labels 
arises mainly because low income consumers generally have limited market knowledge, 
and rarely attend to product panel information (Sullivan 2003; Berman and Evans 
2010).In fact, some low income consumers in the South African market are illiterate such 
that they cannot read panel information and product labelling (Wyma et al 2012), thus 
they end up buying well-known category leaders which are typically national brands. 
This result is also consistent with current research which finds that highly educated 
consumers are more likely to buy the private labels, while less-educated individuals are 
more likely to buy national brands of an otherwise homogenous product (Bronnenburg et 
al (2015). 
I also found that aspirational descriptive appeals favorably impact low-income 
consumers’ willingness to pay and purchase intentions for private labels. In conjunction 
with study 1, this result supports the notion that social influence plays a pivotal role in 
shaping the consumption decisions of low-income consumers in a grocery retail setting. 
Importantly, this highlights that low income consumers preferences for private labels are 
influenced by the preferences of high-income consumers. In view of the fact that low 
income consumers have limited information on private labels it is reasonable that their 
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brand choices are influenced by an aspirational reference group. Moreover, they may 
infer that private labels are high quality because high income consumers are buying them.  
However, contradictory to the US study results, I also found that descriptive 
appeals that highlight the consumptions patterns of low-income consumers (i.e. in-group 
descriptive appeals) were also effective at motivating other low-income consumers to buy 
private labels. This implies, that consumers in this market conform to the choices of their 
peers and considering that low income consumers lack knowledge on private labels, 
learning that in-group members purchase private labels may signal the brand’s efficacy 
thereby motivating purchase.  This is also in line with prior research which shows that 
consumers learn from in-group members (Carlson, Suter, and Brown 2008). Last, in 
contradiction to the fourth hypothesis, results partially showed that the appeals were more 
effective in increasing participants’ private label willingness to pay for utilitarian 
products as compared to hedonic products. This may be due to the fact that low-income 
consumers in emerging markets rarely spend on discretionary items; thus when they do, 
they may prefer to purchase national brands that are high in status.  
General Discussion  
The current research focuses on finding out how to persuade to low-income consumers to 
buy private labels products. Using results from two studies, in two different countries, I 
provide different explanations and processes for why, social influence together with 
informational appeals, may be a good way to persuade low-income individuals to 
purchase more private labels. In addition, the fact that my results are consistent across 
two different countries (US and South Africa) that not only differ in the retailing 
environment but also socioeconomic conditions highlights the generalizability of my 
 
 
111 
 
findings.  Together the two studies provide convergent evidence that informational 
appeals are the most effective technique of motivating low-income households to buy 
private labels. This suggests that consumer knowledge on brand attributes, and brand 
quality plays an important role in the formation of private label preferences.  
I also found empirical support that descriptive appeals that highlight consumption 
patterns of aspirational reference groups also effectively motivate low-income consumers 
to buy private labels, though to a lesser degree than informational appeals. Both these 
findings are consistent not only in the US but also in South Africa. However, my results 
reveal that descriptive appeals that highlight consumption patterns of low-income 
consumers are only effective at prompting low-income consumers to buy private labels in 
the South African Market. In fact, in the US market, they result in low-income consumers 
avoiding private labels all together. This may be due to the fact that low income 
consumers in the US may feel a greater need to dissociate with fellow low income 
consumers more than low income consumers in the South African market. Prior studies 
find that the “poverty shaming” is more apparent in wealthier economies as having little 
money in a society where ‘everyone’ is thought to be rich suggests that you are not hard-
working (Aamodt 2008).Moreover, low income individuals in individualistic cultures are 
more likely to veer away from group expectations as compared to individuals of 
collective cultures (Bian and Forsythe 2011). 
 Taken together, the findings from this study suggest that low-income consumers 
prefer national brands to private labels for two main reasons. First, they do not consume 
private labels because they are generally unaware of private label attributes and quality.  
This may be due to the fact that private labels are rarely advertised and because of 
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financial constraints low-income consumers may be wary about trying new and 
unfamiliar brands because of the relative risk associated with them (Sinha and Batra 
1999). Second, low-income may prefer national brands to private labels because of social 
influence. More specifically, the preferences of low-income consumers are influenced by 
associative and dissociative reference groups. Several lines of evidence lead to this 
conclusion.  
First, I found that low-income individuals are upward comparing as their 
preferences for private labels are increased in the aspirational descriptive appeal 
condition. Ultimately, these comparisons result in them desiring products associated with 
higher income individuals. In both the US and South African markets low-income 
consumers readily associate national brands with high status and private labels with low 
status suggesting that they believe high-income individuals consume national brands. 
Evidently, low-income consumers’ choice between private labels and national brands is 
influenced by high-income consumers. This is because low-income consumers aspire to 
be like high-income individuals who are treated more favorably, are more influential, 
gain leadership roles and receive more social opportunities than low-income individuals 
(Huberman et al 2004). 
Second, the results I obtain for in-group descriptive appeals highlight that 
consumers, may not be buying private labels in an effort to dissociate themselves from 
other low-income consumers. However, I only found evidence for this result in the US 
market and not the South African market. This may be due to the fact that there is a large 
proportion of low-income consumers in South Africa hence group identification maybe 
stronger. Whereas in the US where there are fewer low-income consumers the desire to 
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dissociate maybe greater. Nonetheless, this result and the fact that low-income 
consumers’ preferences for national brands are influenced by the desire to associate with 
higher income households highlights the role of social influence in non-durable product 
categories consumed in private. 
Importantly, this shows the role of social influence in areas where it has not been 
studied before. As a matter of fact, the majority of prior research primarily focuses on 
publicly consumed durable products, hence in this study I take a first attempt to 
understand how status seeking behavior impacts brand choice in non-durable products 
such as grocery items. My research also contributes to the existing literature by showing 
the effectiveness of different types of appeals when marketing presumably low status 
products to low-income individuals. Notably, this also an area current research is mute 
on, therefore I also provide initial insights as to why compared to high-income 
consumers, low-income consumers do to not purchase less expensive generic brands, 
particularly those privately consumed.  
Managerial Implications  
Knowledge gained from this research can be utilized for developing targeting 
strategies by private labels marketers. The study reveals that retailers can appeal to low-
income consumers by highlighting improvements in private label quality. This suggests 
that informational advertising that provides consumers with factual relevant brand data in 
a clear and conscience way will most likely increase private label sales. Therefore 
retailers can design ad campaigns which provide consumers relevant brand information. 
For example, their campaigns can reference reports by consumer advocacy groups 
comparing their products with national brands.  Moreover, this information could be 
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made available at the point of purchase. Retail brand managers can also conduct blind 
taste test with both private labels and national brands within their stores. This will 
increase consumer knowledge on private labels and also purchase likelihood.  
Granted that, the study also confirmed that, low-income consumers purchase 
national brands because of social influence (i.e. aspirational reference groups) it is 
therefore imperative for retailers to position their private labels as aspirational or 
premium products that are consumed by high income people. For example, they can start 
marketing campaigns with central themes that reveal the consumption patterns of high-
income consumers. This targeting will not only increase private label market share but 
can also increase overall consumer welfare as private labels are almost always less 
expensive than national brands. 
Conclusion  
In this essay I find that informational appeals are the most effective persuasive 
technique of motivating low income consumers to buy private labels. I also find that 
descriptive appeals have mixed effects as they can either motivate or dissuade low 
income consumers from buying private labels.  Importantly, in this essay I explain how 
consumer perceptions about private labels contribute to the low penetration rates of 
private labels in emerging economies. I highlight the role of consumer knowledge and 
social influence in brand choice. Specifically, I find that low-income consumers prefer 
national brands over private labels for two main reasons. First, low-income consumers 
are uninformed about private labels, they are generally unaware that private quality 
advances hence they avoid buying them. Second, low-income consumers buy national 
brands so as to enhance their social standing. They, fervently believe that high-income 
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consumers buy national brands and thus they desire national brands as well. Taken 
together these results suggest that private labels in emerging economies are low because 
consumers prefer national brands to private labels.  
As with most studies, this research is also subject to limitations despite its 
contribution. The primary limitation of this research is that it does not distinguish 
between private labels in different quality-tiers, potentially limiting the generalizability to 
other product classes. Most retailers now manage their private labels as part of a 
portfolio. They often carry in their portfolios three private labels that target premium 
quality, standard quality and economical shoppers at three different price points thus the 
effectiveness of the appeals may depend on the tier of the private labels. For example, 
aspirational appeals may be more effective in motivating consumers to buy upper-tier 
private labels as they are positioned as premium brands, and are likely to be high status. 
Whereas informational appeals may be effective at motivating low-income individuals to 
buy low-tier private labels where functionality is more important. Therefore, this is an 
area that future studies can consider. 
 Future studies may also look into the whether the effectiveness of the appeals 
vary with the retailers store image. For example, consumers may view differently private 
labels from Target and Walmart. Therefore, the effectiveness of the appeals maybe 
different based on the retailers’ store image. For example, informational appeals may be 
more effective with Walmart brands which are mostly positioned as “no frill” private 
labels. Last future research can also look into whether low-income households’ choice of 
brands are affected by social presence (i.e., the presence of another person or group of 
individuals). More specifically, does the presence of other consumers’ impact low 
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income individuals’ choice between private labels and national brands? This would aid in 
further understanding the effect of social influence on private label preferences which I 
have put forward in this study.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation, I provide a better understanding of why private labels have yet 
to succeed in emerging economies. In three essays I highlight how large national brand 
manufacturers, retailers, and consumers each contribute in inhibiting private label growth 
in emerging markets. I contribute to current literature on private label proliferation by 
first, explaining the link between manufacturer bargaining power and private label market 
shares in emerging economies.  
In most emerging markets national brand manufacturers produce both national 
brands and private labels, this arrangement favors manufacturers, allowing them to set 
relatively high wholesale prices on private labels, which in turn leads to high private label 
retail prices, and low private label market shares. Partly explaining why private label 
market shares are low in emerging economies. Importantly, these results generalize 
beyond the markets and the product category considered here. They provide broader 
insights into manufacturer-retailer relationships. Specifically, they highlight that national 
brand manufacturers with bargaining power can influence not only private label market 
shares but also retail prices of both national brands and private labels. This phenomenon 
can occur in any market where there are dominant manufacturers. For example, in China 
where private label market shares averages about 1.3% a few national brand 
manufacturers are responsible for private label manufacturing (Song 2011).  Therefore, it 
is likely that they have bargaining power over retailers as in the South African market. 
These results can also translate to in any industry that it is “top heavy” with a few 
upstream firms and a relatively larger number of downstream firms.  In that case the 
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upstream firms may have bargaining power over the downstream firms, and they may be 
able to impact retail prices and market shares of the downstream firms.  For example, 
large pharmaceutical drug manufacturers may have bargaining power over private label 
distributors approved by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  
Last, in essay 1 I find that even though national brand manufacturers have 
bargaining power, sophisticated retailers in emerging economies can realize higher 
margins on private labels by either producing their own private labels or by partnering 
with contract manufacturers. This may not only increase their profitability but also it may 
improve consumer welfare in that a competitive private label market may result in the 
growth of private labels and lower overall retail prices. Moreover, the growth of private 
labels will create competitive pressure on national brands thereby restricting bargaining 
power of dominant brands and engendering better quality, and more innovation (Meza 
and Sudhir 2009). 
Prior studies also find that when the category share of private labels increase, 
national brand manufacturers guard their brands by reducing their prices, undertaking in 
extensive promotional activities, and differentiating their products which in turn benefits 
consumers (Nelson and Hilke 1991; Lenius 1997; Rao and Mills 1999; Richards and 
Pofahl 2001; Steiner 2004). Importantly, the expansion of private labels can aid 
households in developing economies to fight food insecurity. According to the FAO 
rising food prices triggered an increase in hunger across developing countries, the 
number of chronically hungry people in 2013 increased by 75 million a 6% rise from 
2011. In fact, evidence points to the fact that food prices are higher in the least developed 
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countries of the world as compared to the wealthier nations, thus, they can benefit from 
less expensive food (World Bank 2011).  
Second my work contributes to the theoretical literature on private label portfolios 
and brand portfolios in general. In my second essay, I find evidence that the price-gap 
between upper-tier and low-tier brands in a retailer’s portfolio impacts market shares.  
More specifically, I find that a narrow price-gap results in increased cannibalization 
between the brands particularly when their prices frequently overlap. Further, the results 
show that a narrow price-gap increases brand similarity, reduces portfolio differentiation, 
and importantly results in lower market shares. This suggests that retailers’ private label 
portfolio management strategies may also in part explain the relatively low private label 
market shares in emerging markets.  
The results from this second study also generalize beyond the market and 
products considered here. In that they highlight that a narrow price-gap between brands in 
a portfolio, private label or otherwise results in high cross-brand sales and market shares. 
For example, a narrow price-gap between Procter & Gambles’ disposable diaper brands 
Luvs and Pampers may result in increased cannibalization between the brands. Likewise, 
a small price-gap between Hilton Hotel’s brands Embassy Suites Hotels and Hilton 
Garden Inn may also result in high cross-brand sales and lower market share. 
Importantly, the small price-gaps may result in increased portfolio similarity which may 
negate the effectiveness of the portfolio. It may also result in loss of revenue as the low-
quality brand may “dilute” the brand image of the high-quality brand.  
My results also point to a positive relationship between highly differentiated 
portfolios and market shares. This result is in line with the principle of maximum 
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differentiation (d’Aspremont et al 1979) and confirms the need for variety within any 
type of portfolio. This may also partly explain why auto-manufacturers such as Honda 
who have smaller but more differentiated portfolios outperform companies such as 
General Motors and Nissan who have larger but less differentiated portfolios. Last, in my 
second study I also find that differentiation between brands in a portfolio should 
encompass attributes as they aid in defining customer segments and positioning. As such 
firms can differentiate their brands on attributes as well. 
In my third essay I find that informational appeals and descriptive appeals are 
effective at motivating behavior change among low income consumers. More 
specifically, I find that informational appeals are the most effective technique of 
encouraging low income consumers to but private labels and that descriptive appeals that 
draw from aspirational reference groups are also effective. As in my previous studies 
these results can also be transferred to other product categories.  For example, policy 
makers can use both descriptive and informational appeals when attempting to motivate 
low-income individuals to adopt healthier eating habits. For informational appeals they 
can focus on providing objective benefits that can be derived from healthy eating. Then 
for descriptive appeals they inform low income individuals about the consumption 
patterns of aspirational reference groups.  
In my third essay I also find that low-income consumers buy national brands 
instead of private labels because mainly because they have limited information on private 
labels and because of social influence. In so doing, I also provide insight into the 
underlying reason why low income consumers do not purchase less expensive products or 
brands from which they would benefit significantly. Moreover, my results also show that 
 
 
121 
 
low-income consumers buy national brands in order to either emulate high-income 
households, dissociate from fellow low-income consumers or to conform to group 
preferences. This result validates the role of social influence in non-durable products such 
as grocery items that are mostly consumed in private. An area current research was yet to 
investigate.   
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APPENDIX A 
ELASTICITIES FOR LIMITED MODEL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
1
3
6
 
Table 13. Own and Cross Price Elasticity Matrix 
 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 V13 V14 V15 
V1 -3.290 0.048 0.049 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.092 0.294 0.133 0.095 0.048 0.048 0.115 0.093 0.087 
V2 0.048 -2.297 0.226 0.023 0.227 0.318 0.431 0.138 0.062 0.045 0.023 0.023 0.054 0.144 0.041 
V3 0.048 0.226 -2.058 0.020 0.203 0.203 0.386 0.124 0.056 0.040 0.021 0.020 0.048 0.039 0.037 
V4 0.048 0.023 0.020 -3.668 0.036 0.036 0.069 0.221 0.100 0.072 0.037 0.036 0.086 0.070 0.065 
V5 0.048 0.227 0.203 0.036 -2.719 0.027 0.051 0.164 0.074 0.053 0.273 0.127 0.064 0.052 0.048 
V6 0.048 0.318 0.203 0.036 0.027 -2.595 0.487 0.156 0.070 0.051 0.026 0.026 0.161 0.049 0.046 
V7 0.092 0.431 0.386 0.069 0.051 0.487 -4.255 0.259 0.117 0.084 0.043 0.043 0.101 0.181 0.076 
V8 0.294 0.138 0.124 0.221 0.164 0.156 0.259 -4.410 0.126 0.091 0.047 0.046 0.109 0.088 0.082 
V9 0.133 0.062 0.056 0.100 0.074 0.070 0.117 0.126 -4.397 0.087 0.045 0.044 0.105 0.085 0.079 
V10 0.095 0.045 0.040 0.072 0.053 0.051 0.084 0.091 0.087 -5.024 0.051 0.050 0.119 0.096 0.090 
V11 0.049 0.023 0.021 0.037 0.273 0.026 0.043 0.047 0.045 0.051 -3.980 0.040 0.094 0.076 0.016 
V12 0.048 0.023 0.020 0.036 0.127 0.026 0.043 0.046 0.044 0.050 0.040 -5.935 0.140 0.113 0.105 
V13 0.115 0.054 0.048 0.086 0.064 0.161 0.101 0.109 0.105 0.119 0.094 0.140 -4.508 0.087 0.081 
V14 0.093 0.144 0.039 0.070 0.052 0.049 0.181 0.088 0.085 0.096 0.076 0.113 0.087 -2.146 0.038 
V15 0.087 0.041 0.037 0.065 0.048 0.046 0.076 0.082 0.079 0.090 0.016 0.105 0.081 0.038 -4.846 
  
 
 
 
 
 137 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
SURVEY QUESTIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
138 
 
Instructions: please answer the questions listed below.  
Section 1 (Demographic Information) 
 
1. How old are you? _________________ years 
 
2. Please indicate your gender: Male____ Female____ 
 
3. Which category best represents your income? 
Less than $10,000  
$10,000 to $29,999  
$30,000 to $49,999  
$50,000 to $69,999  
$70,000 to $99,999  
More than $100,000  
 
4. How many people are in your household? ____ 
 
5. What is the highest level of education you have achieved? 
High School Diploma  
Some College  
Technical School Diploma  
Associate Degree  
Bachelor’s Degree  
Graduate Degree  
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6. Please respond whether you agree or disagree with the following statements 
                  Strongly Agree                                                     Strongly Disagree                                                                                                                                      
 
My family usually had 
enough money for 
things when I was 
growing up.  
 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
 
 
8 
 
 
9 
 
I grew up in a 
relatively wealthy 
neighborhood. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
 
 
I felt relatively 
wealthy compared to 
the other kids in my 
school. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
I have enough money 
to buy things I want 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
I don’t need to worry 
too much about 
paying my bills 
 
 
   1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
I don’t think I’ll have 
to worry about money 
too much in the 
future. 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
140 
 
Section 2 (Manipulations) 
Instructions: 
In this study we are interested in your inherent comprehension skills. Below is a passage 
taken out of a recent Washington Post publication, please read it carefully and answer the 
questions that follow.  
Informational Appeal 
Store brands or private labels are brands owned, controlled, and sold exclusively 
by a retailer. Their existence can be traced back centuries where they were found 
in a few product categories such as tea and cleaning materials. However, over the 
years they have evolved from low quality generics packaged mostly in white 
packaging with black lettering to “real brands”. Currently private labels are 
available in over 60 % of all grocery categories in the USA and according to the 
Private Label Manufacturers Association over the past 5 years, annual sales of 
private-label products have risen by over 40% in supermarkets and by 96% in drug 
chains, reaching more than $100 billion in 2014. The growth of private labels can 
be attributed to their improvement in quality, in fact, numerous industry reports 
points to evidence that shows that private labels’ objective quality is now, equal to 
or even greater than, the objective quality of comparable national brands. The rise 
in popularity in private labels has also spurred national brand manufacturers to 
enter into contracts with retailers in which they produce the private labels for them. 
According to a recent survey by Private Label Manufacturers Association 75% of 
the private labels are produced my national brand manufacturers.  (*Excerpt from 
the Washington Post May, 2015). 
Aspirational Appeal Manipulation 
Store brands or private labels are brands owned, controlled, and sold exclusively 
by a retailer. Their existence can be traced back centuries where they were found 
in a few product categories such as tea and cleaning materials. However, over the 
years they have evolved from low quality generics packaged mostly in white 
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packaging with black lettering to “real brands”. Currently private labels are 
available in over 60 % of all grocery categories in the USA and according to the 
Private Label Manufacturers Association over the past 5 years, annual sales of 
private-label products have risen by over 40% in supermarkets and by 96% in drug 
chains, reaching more than $100 billion in 2014. The growth of private labels can 
be attributed to high income households. Numerous industry reports points to 
evidence that shows that private labels’ are mostly consumed by high income 
households. In fact, more than 85% of high-income households have acknowledged 
that they purchase private labels on each shopping trip (*Excerpt from the 
Washington Post May, 2015). 
In-group Appeal  
Store brands or private labels are brands owned, controlled, and sold exclusively 
by a retailer. Their existence can be traced back centuries where they were found 
in a few product categories such as tea and cleaning materials. However, over the 
years they have evolved from low quality generics packaged mostly in white 
packaging with black lettering to “real brands”. Currently private labels are 
available in over 60 % of all grocery categories in the USA and according to the 
Private Label Manufacturers Association over the past 5 years, annual sales of 
private-label products have risen by over 40% in supermarkets and by 96% in drug 
chains, reaching more than $100 billion in 2014. The growth of private labels can 
be attributed to low income households. Numerous industry reports points to 
evidence that shows that private labels’ are mostly consumed by low income 
households. In fact, more than 85% of low-income households have acknowledged 
that they purchase private labels on each shopping trip (*Excerpt from the 
Washington Post May, 2015). 
Control Group  
Cricket is a team sport played between two teams of eleven players on each side. It 
is a bat-and-ball game played on a roughly elliptical grass field, in the center of 
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which is a hard, flat strip of ground 22 yards (20.12 m) long, called a pitch. A 
player from one team (the bowler) propels a hard, fist-sized leather ball from one 
set of wooden stumps, called a wicket, towards the other. A player from the 
opposing team (the batsman) attempts to defend the wicket from the ball with a 
wooden cricket bat. Another batsman (the partner of the defending player) stands 
in an inactive role near the bowler's wicket. If the batsman hits the ball with his 
bat, he may run to the other wicket, exchanging places with his partner. This scores 
a run. While the batting team attempts to score as many runs as it can, members of 
the bowling team gather the ball and return it to either wicket. If the ball that is 
thrown by a fielder strikes a wicket while the nearest batsman is still running, the 
batsman is out, or "dismissed". Batsmen can also be out by other means, such as 
failing to defend the bowled ball from hitting the wicket, or hitting a catch to a 
fielder. Once out, a batsman is replaced by the next batsman in the team. As there 
must always be two batsmen on the field, if and when the tenth batsman is out, the 
team's turn to bat (innings) is over, and the other team may bat while the first team 
takes the field.  
(*Excerpt from the Washington Post May, 2015). 
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SECTION 3 (Brand Choice) *the brands and products used here were determined in a 
pretest 
7. Imagine on one of your trips to the grocery store to you are presented with the 
choices listed below. Please indicate your purchase intention for each choice. 
                               Yes Certainly                                          Certainly 
Not  
Yoplait yogurt  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Oikos yogurt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Chobani yogurt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Great Value yogurt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Kroger yogurt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Market Pantry yogurt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Viva paper towels 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Bounty paper towels 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Brawny paper towels 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Great Value paper towels 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Kroger Home paper 
towels 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Up & Up paper towels 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
8. Please indicate your Willingness To Pay for each of the brands listed below 
 
Yoplait yogurt   
Oikos yogurt  
Chobani yogurt  
Great Value yogurt  
Kroger yogurt  
Market Pantry yogurt  
Viva paper towels  
Bounty paper towels  
Brawny paper towels  
Great Value paper towels  
Kroger Home paper towels  
Up & Up paper towels  
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SECTION 3 (SHOPPING TRENDS) 
 
9. How often do you shop for groceries? 
More than 4 times a week  
3 to 4 times a week  
1 to 2 times a week  
Once every other week   
Once a month  
Less than once a week  
 
 
10. Which store do you usually buy your groceries from? ____ 
 
11. Have you ever purchased any one of the following brands? 
Wal-Mart Store Brands  
Kroger/Fry’s Store Brands  
Target Store Brands  
Safeway Store Brands   
Trader Joes Store Brands  
Whole Foods Store Brands  
 
12. On average, how often do you consume yogurt? 
More than 4 times a week  
3-4 times week  
1-2 times a week  
Once a week   
Less than once a month  
 
13. On average, how often do you shop for paper towels? 
More than 4 times a week  
3-4 times week  
1-2 times a week  
Once a week   
Less than once a month  
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14. Please indicate which of the following promotional activities you look for when 
purchasing yogurt? 
                                                 Dislike it very much                Like it very much 
Weekly special at grocery store 1 2 3 4 5 
Coupons 1 2 3 4 5 
Manufacturer’s rebate 1 2 3 4 5 
Club price  1 2 3 4 5 
 
15. Please indicate which of the following promotional activities you look for when 
purchasing paper towels? 
                                               Dislike it very much                 Like it very much 
Weekly special at grocery store 1 2 3 4 5 
Coupons 1 2 3 4 5 
Manufacturer’s rebate 1 2 3 4 5 
Club price  1 2 3 4 5 
 
